360 Jail Sentence, Appeal Brief, 60 pages

360 Day Jail Sentence Appeal to Nebraska Appeal Court, Brief, Composed by Paul John: Hansen.     (Word Document, parts are scrambled in transfer.)

NO. A-10-000983                     (due  1-12-10) Gray

IN THE NEBRASKA COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF NEBRASKA

Plaintiff, Appellee

vs.

Paul John:Hansen, a Free Inhabitant

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF DOUGLAS COUNTY, NEBRASKA

(County CR 09-11581, McDermott)

Doc 181   No. 996     Judge, Hartigan

(Amended)  BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Prepared and Submitted by:

_______________________

C/O  Paul John:Hansen, a free inhabitant

5311 Navajo Street

Council Bluffs, Iowa

402-957-2853

pauljjhansen@hotmail.com

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Statement of the Basis of Jurisdiction upon the Appeals Court…………………………2-3

Statement of the Case, Issues before the Court, Scope …(R-p20)………………………4-5

Assignments / Statement of Error, § 2-109(D)(1)(e)……………………………………5-7

Proposition of law……………………………………………………………………….…8-12

Statement of the Facts …………………………………………………………………….12-15

Brief/Arguments associated with errors …………………………………………..…15-48

Summary of the Argument.. ……………………………………………………………48-50

Certificate of Service…………………………………………………………………….50

Statement of the basis of jurisdiction of the Appeals Court

Judgment rendered by Douglas County District Court, affirming, on the date of September 8, 2010 of the Douglas County Court Order with Poverty Affidavit.

Appealed filed by Paul John on October 5, 2010 in forma pauperis.   Pauperis Order issued October 28, 2009 (T 5).  Appeal authorized by the Constitution of the State of Nebraska, Article I, Section 23, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1912 (Reissue 2008), and Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-230 1 (Reissue 2008).  Also of common law as right to all ‘free inhabitants’ as found in Article IV in the Articles of Confederation of November 15, 1777.  -Nebraska Revised Statute Section 25-1911,  Appellate jurisdiction; scope.  “A judgment rendered or final order made by the district court may be reversed, vacated, or modified for errors appearing on the record.” Source:Laws 1991, LB 732, § 51,  “When a defendant appeals a conviction and sentence under a municipal ordinance, claiming insufficiency of the evidence…, an appellate court’s consideration of the assignments of error requires examination of the specific ordinance involved,…. that the evidence sustains the findings of the trial court, ….” Frederick C., 594 N.W.2d 294 Neb.App.,1999.      “The party invoking jurisdiction bears the burden of proof that all prerequisites to jurisdiction are satisfied.” Hatridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 415 F.2d 809, 814 (8th Cir. 1969).

Annotations:
1. Scope:  -   “The Supreme Court reviews determinations made in the district courts only where there is a judgment rendered or final order made by the district court.”  Lewis v. Craig, 236 Neb. 602, 463 N.W.2d 318 (1990).       -   Judgment may be reversed “for errors appearing on record.” Frey v. Drahos, 7 Neb. 194 (1878); Morrill v. Taylor, 6 Neb. 236 (1877).2. Appeal proper   -   “Judgment should be reversed where clearly wrong on sole issue of fact involved.”     In re Estate of O’Connor, 105 Neb. 88, 179 N.W. 401 (1920).  “In reviewing a criminal conviction,… and a conviction will be affirmed, in the absence of prejudicial error, if the properly admitted evidence,… is sufficient to support the conviction.”   STATE of Nebraska, v. William J. HILL, 254 Neb. 460, 577 N.W.2d 259, 1998.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When dispositive issues on appeal present questions of law, an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent conclusion inspective of the decision of the court below. State ‘i. Smith, 267 Neb. 917, 920, 678 N.W.2d 733, 735-36 (2004).    When reviewing a criminal conviction on appeal, it is not the duty of the appellate court reviewing the defendant’s conviction to resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on the credibility of the witnesses, or reweigh the evidence. State v. Curlile, 11 Neb. App. 52, 55, 642 N.W.2d 517, 520 (2002). Such matters are for the finder of fact, and the defendant’s conviction must be affirmed if the properly admitted evidence, viewed and construed most favorably to the State, is sufficient to support the conviction. Id. The findings of the court have the effect of a jury verdict and cannot be disturbed by an appellate court unless they are clearly wrong. Id.

Statement of the Case & Issues before the Court

NOTICE-Hereinafter Paul shall mean captioned Appellant.  -The term Defendant, Appellant, Paul, shall not be construed to mean a statutory entity, but Paul as a man of lawful standing of right with all rights and liberties preserved, not a corporate sole, an free inhabitant.       –Court shall mean County Court and the Affirming District Court.    -The term property shall mean Paul’s private Land as associated with this case, Land not owned by the United States of America.   1. The appeal is a Law argument in nature. ‘Due process’, violations based on Paul’s standing as to the courts personal jurisdiction.    2. Issue before the Court:  ‘City of Omaha Planning Department’ gave citations to Paul for the following:   1, “unsafe structure, 48-71 (a)” (T:9, 18) guilty.  12. “failure to comply with notice, 48-53” (T,7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20) guilty.   1. “Obstructing Administrative Law, 20-21” (T, 21, 23) guilty.  1. “False Information, 20-26” (T, 22) guilty.  1. “Resisting Arrest, 20-22” (T, 24) guilty.  1. “imminent danger, 48-81” (T,6)  to wit found guilty.

Issue in Dispute:

a. If Paul is a type of entity as found in each individual charging statute.    b. If Paul received constitutional notice as to his duty to perform each individual charging statute.    c. If Appellee had a duty to serve a constitutional notice upon Paul before demanding a duty from him, thus no notice equates to no transgression.    d. If the record shows evidence from the Appellee, of personal jurisdiction as challenged by Paul. And if no personal jurisdiction of the County Court was produced at the minimum this would have opened an opportunity for Paul to access a trial by jury as in common law as a right per-Articles of Confederation of November 15, 1777.

d1. If Appellee produced evidence of a promulgation rule/process that gives evidence that Paul and Paul’s private property has been included, by a competent authority, to give each charged statute force and effect of law upon Paul and/or His land.    e. If Paul’s demand for a trial by jury was one of right if the Appellee could not prove he was subject to a statutory bench trial.

g. If Paul was deprived of the above, therefore he was ultimately deprived of his right to an opportunity to a non-statutory ‘trial by jury’ or if no evidence existed on the record to subjected Paul to corporate/administrative/trial and deny Paul’s right to a jury trial.    h. If the Omaha Municipal Code, or any State Code has force and effect of law on territory  NOT owned or ceded to the United States of America.                       SCOPE

1. The scope of the Appeals Court review:  To take notice of the constitutional violations and vacate the conviction, or remand as appropriate, and primarily to force the Plaintiff to produce factual, documented, evidence of ‘personal jurisdiction’ and all essential elements of Subject Matter Jurisdiction on the record.    2. The Court is asked to find evidence that all information’s (charging documents) are in fact vague, and do have all the essential elements so as not to violate Paul’s liberties and rights, nor prejudice Paul from a fair trial and a due process notice.

Assignment/ Statements of Errors

Below are Errors Noticed by Public Defender:

I.                    The County Court abused its discretion when it denied Appellant’s Request for Discovery. The County Court never gave a justification of its denial of Appellant’s Request for Discovery. The denial of Appellant’s Request for Discovery unfairly deprived Appellant of his right to a fair trial.    II.     The County Court erred when it convicted Appellant for Giving False Information because Appellant believed the information to be true. Since the crime of Giving False Information requires knowledge of the falsity, the Appellant did not have requisite mental state to support the conviction.    III.     The County Court erred when it convicted Appellant for Obstruction of a Law Enforcement Officer because Appellant’s acts were not done with the intent to interfere with Officer Collins’ official duties.    IV.      The County Court erred in convicting Appellant of Obstruction of Law Enforcement because Appellant was not under arrest when he entered the stairwell.  In order for the act of flight to constitute the crime of Obstruction of a Law Enforcement Officer, there must be a command not to flee. Appellant was not given a command by Officer Hansen, so he was free to leave via the stairwell.    V.          The County Court erred in convicting Appellant for Resisting Arrest because Appellant was not under arrest when he entered the stairwell. In order for the act of flight to constitute Resisting Arrest there must be a command not to flee. Appellant was not given a command by Officer Hansen, so he was free to leave via the stairwell.    VI. The County Court’s sentence of 14 concurrent sentences of 6 months to run consecutively to 4 concurrent sentences of 6 months was excessive. The court did not properly take into consideration the Timmens’ factors of the nature of the offense and the amount of violence involved in the commission of the offense. State v. Timmens, 263 Neb. 622, 631, 641 N.W.2d 383, 391 (2002). The judge erred when he was influenced by irrelevant information such as Appellant’s pro se representation and unique trial tactics. State v. Pattno, 254 Neb. 733. 579 N.W.2d 503 (1998).

Below are Additional Errors Noticed by Appelant, Public Defender Refused to List:

A. All Charging Statutes are vague, therefore unconstitutional as applied;    B. All Charging Statutes and Information(s) lack essential elements of specifics to give constitutional notice;

C. Defendant Received no constitutional notice from agency;    D. Trial Court refused to reveal its jurisdiction to deny defendant a type of trial by jury;     E. State failed to prove, on the record, subject property was in the jurisdiction of the corporate STATE OF NEBRASKA;

F. State failed to prove, on the record, subject property was in the jurisdiction of the corporate CITY OF OMAHA;    G. Court failed to confirm that prosecutor was licensed by the STATE OF NEBRASKA authorities;    H. Court errored to see Defendant had no funds to repair or demo any subject buildings, therefore can not be punished for failure to perform an impossibility;

I. Court errored to see that Nebraska statutes chapter 28 does not include a violation of an Omaha Building Municipal Code as a criminal act;    J. Court errored in not noticing that no affidavit accompanied the information of a party being damaged by the man called Paul John Hansen, as “not” a named corporation.    K. Court errored when Defendant motioned for Plaintiff to prove up Personal Jurisdiction, on the record, with written findings of fact and conclusions of law, to which nothing was placed on the record, nether were findings written into the record.

L. Court errored to see that the Plaintiff failed to produced sufficient evidence that each individual charge did in fact apply (promulgation-subject matter jurisdiction) to the Defendant as a private man, His Land, and not a statutory person/entity only.  (Essentially acknowledging a difference of Public statutes vs. free inhabitant.)     M. Court errored in not noticing that Paul was denied due process.    N. Court errored in not noticing no evidence is in the record of a promulgated rule that identifies, reaches, notices, Paul as one subject to the municipal code to be applied to Paul, to prove force and effect of law.     O. Court errored in not noticing that no statute is found in the record making a violation of a municipal code a criminal violation.

P. The Court errored that a charge of “Giving False Information” is not a criminal act subject to arrest.    Q. The Court errored in not noticing that when Paul was arrested and told he was going to be booked that he was not taken before a Magistrate as is due process for any act that is not a breach of the peace.

Propositions & Evidence of Law

1. Appellant had a right to discovery.

“Discovery in a criminal case is generally, and in the absence of a constitutional requirement, controlled by either a statute or court rule.” State v. Kinney, 262 Neb. 812, 635 N.W.2d 449 (2001).  -“While a defendant does not by law have a right to discovery, the court must not abuse its discretion when denying a discovery request.” State v. Phelps, 241 Neb. 707, 490 N.W.2d 676 (1992).  -“…deprive the defendant of a substantial right and a just result.” State v. Segura, 265 Neb. 903, 909, 660 N.W.2d 512, 5 17-18 (2003).  -“Where a court failed to observe safeguards, it amounts to denial of due process of law, court is deprived of jurisdiction.”    Merritt v. Hunter, C.A. Kansas 170 F2d 739

2. Appellant had a right to prepare a defense and denial of discovery infringed on that right. A judicial abuse of discretion exists when the reasons or rulings of a trial court are clearly untenable, thereby unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial right or a just result in matters properly submitted for judicial disposition. State v. Mantich, 249 Neb. 311, 543 N.W.2d 181 (1996).

3. Appellant did no act to warrant an arrest.

Newton v. Huffman, 10 Neb.App. 390, 632 N.W.2d 344 (2001) (holding that arrest is based on the totality of the circumstances as understood by a reasonable person).

4. Insufficient evidence against Appellant as to all Charges.

“…court has abused its discretion.” State v. Hurbenca, 266 Neb. 853, 865, 669 N.W.2d 668, 676 (2003).

5. Excessive sentence for a non-violent crime.

“…court abused its discretion in considering and applying circumstantial factors as well as any applicable legal principles in determining the sentence to be imposed.” State v. Miller, 11 Neb. App. 404,411,651 N.W.2d 594, 600 (2002).  “…clearly against justice, reason, or evidence, constitute an abuse of discretion.” State v. Harrison, 255 Neb. 990, 1001, 588 N.W.2d 556, 562 (1999).  “In imposing a sentence, a judge should consider the defendant’s age, mentality, education, experience, and social and cultural background, as well as his or her past criminal record or law-abiding conduct, motivation for the offense, nature of the offense, and the amount of violence involved in the commission of the crime.” State v. Timmens, 263 Neb. 622, 631, 641 N.W.2d 383, 391 (2002).  The Nebraska Supreme Court made clear in Pattno that, “Due Process requires that Sentencing judges consider only relevant information as the basis for a sentence.” State v. Pattno, 254 Neb. 733, 741, 579 N.W.2d 503 (1998) (citing State v. Clear, 236 Neb. 648, 463 N.W.2d 581 (1990).

6. Appellant had a right to trial by jury based on fact that no evidence exist that He was a type of ‘person as defined in the statute that has no such right.

-Due process of law in a criminal case includes right to trial by jury and right to defend in person or by counsel. Johnson v. State, 169 Neb. 783, 100 N.W.2d 844 (1960).

– The Constitution guarantees a fair and impartial trial to every person accused of crime, and that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor shall he be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Coxbill v. State, 115 Neb. 634, 214 N.W. 256 (1927).  -“In common usage, the term `person’ does not include the sovereign and statutes employing it will ordinarily not be construed to do so.” – US Supreme Court in U.S. v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 67 SCt 677 (1947):  -“Since in common usage, the term `person’ does not include the sovereign, statutes employing the phrase are ordinarily construed to exclude it.” – US Supreme Court in US v. Fox 94 US 315

7. Appellant had a right to constitutional notice.

-“test of sufficiency of the indictment or information is whether it contains all

essential elements of offense as set out in statute and clearly apprises defendant of fact

constituting the offense”. State v. Simpson, 846 S.W. 2d 724 (Mo.1993); and State v. Quigley 829 S.W. 2d 117(Mo.App.1992)  -“…due to improper service and lack of actual notice, a court fails to obtain personal jurisdiction over the party in possession of or owning the property being sold.”   Curtis v. Giff, 17 Neb.App. 149, 757 N.W.2d 139, Neb. App., 2008.

8. Appellant had a right to written findings when demanded / motioned.

-“The court need only state its finding generally unless one of the parties timely requests conclusions of fact.” Henkle & Joyce Hardware Co. v. Maco, Inc., 195 Neb. 565, 239 N.W.2d 772 (1976).      Special findings are unnecessary unless requested. Bailey v. McCoy, 187 Neb. 618, 193 N.W.2d 270 (1971).  -“It is material when it affects whether the defendant received adequate notice from the information and it is prejudicial when it affects the defendant’s ability to to..adequately defend against the charges in the information and those given to the jury in the instructions.” Turner v State, 892 S.W.2d 737 (Mo.App.1994).

9. When the Court lost personal or subject matter jurisdiction it had a duty to dismiss.

-“Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.” Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 514 (1869).

-“While the plaintiffs bear the ultimate burden of proof, personal jurisdiction need not be proved by a preponderance of the evidence until trial or until the court holds an evidentiary hearing.” Ameritas Inv. Corp. v. McKinney, 269 Neb. 564, 694 N.W.2d 191 Neb.,2005.

-“Lack of personal jurisdiction may be waived and such jurisdiction conferred by the conduct of the parties.” Trogdon v. Trogdon, 18 Neb.App. 313, 780 N.W.2d 45, Neb.App.,2010.

-“Personal jurisdiction is the power of a tribunal to subject and bind a particular entity to its decisions.”    “Lack of personal jurisdiction may be waived and such jurisdiction conferred by the conduct of the parties.” Trogdon v. Trogdon, 18 Neb.App. 313, 780 N.W.2d 45, Neb.App.,2010

-“A judgment entered without personal jurisdiction is void.”  Cave v. Reiser 268 Neb. 539, 684 N.W.2d 580, Neb.,2004.  -“…a party could file a special appearance for the sole purpose of objecting to the court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction over the objector.”   Miller v. Steichen, 268 Neb. 328, 682 N.W.2d 702, Neb.,2004.  -“the party seeking to establish the court’s in personam jurisdiction still carries the burden of proof, and the burden does not shift to the party challenging jurisdiction.” Ameritas Inv. Corp. v. McKinney, 269 Neb. 564, 694 N.W.2d 191 (2005).  -“To defeat a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the nonmoving party need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction.” Applied Underwriters, Inc. v. Employer Outsource Service, Inc., 2007 WL 1470454 (Neb. Ct. App. 2007).  -Plaintiff has burden to sustain requisite jurisdiction when motion is made to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, but once prima facie case has been established, defendant bears burden of producing evidence to rebut that showing.   Omni Lingua, Inc. v. Great Golf Resorts of World, Inc. 500 N.W.2d 721, Iowa App.,1993.  -The Court of Appeals held that personal jurisdiction over nonresident former employee was consistent with due process. Omaha Cold Storage Terminals v. Cunningham 417 N.W.2d 254, Iowa App.,1987.

10. Appellant had a right to a trial by jury do to his sovereign standing.

-“..The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, ..”  Neb. Const. art. I, sec. 6 (1875)  “It is a part of our fundamental law that the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.” Fugate v. Skate, 169 Neb. 420, 99 N.W.2d 868 (1959).  -“For the purpose of breach of the peace statute, peace is that state and sense of safety which is necessary to the comfort and happiness of every citizen, and which government is instituted to secure.”  State v. Edwards, 239 S,C. 339, 123 S.E. 2d 247, 249.  “When acting to enforce a statute and its subsequent amendments to the present date, the judge of the municipal court is acting as an administrative officer and not in a judicial capacity; courts in administering or enforcing statutes do not act judicially, but merely ministerially”.    Thompson v. Smith, 154 SE 583.
11. Appellant has a right to have this case reversed or vacated.

-“A judgment rendered or final order made by the district court may be reversed, vacated, or modified for errors appearing on the record.”    Source:        Laws 1991, LB 732, § 51

“When a defendant appeals a conviction and sentence under a municipal ordinance, claiming insufficiency of the evidence…, an appellate court’s consideration of the assignments of error requires examination of the specific ordinance involved,…. that the evidence sustains the findings of the trial court, ….” Frederick C., 594 N.W.2d 294 Neb.App.,1999.      “The party invoking jurisdiction bears the burden of proof that all prerequisites to jurisdiction are satisfied.” Hatridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 415 F.2d 809, 814 (8th Cir. 1969).  –“The Supreme Court reviews determinations made in the district courts only where there is a judgment rendered or final order made by the district court.”  Lewis v. Craig, 236 Neb. 602, 463 N.W.2d 318 (1990). -   Judgment may be reversed “for errors appearing on record.” Frey v. Drahos, 7 Neb. 194 (1878); Morrill v. Taylor, 6 Neb. 236 (1877).2. Appeal proper   -   “Judgment should be reversed where clearly wrong on sole issue of fact involved.”   In re Estate of O’Connor, 105 Neb. 88, 179 N.W. 401.

“In reviewing a criminal conviction,… and a conviction will be affirmed, in the absence of prejudicial error, if the properly admitted evidence,… is sufficient to support the conviction.”   STATE of Nebraska, v. William J. HILL, 254 Neb. 460, 577 N.W.2d 259, 1998.

12. Defendant has a natural right to own, use, enjoy, alienate, and even exclude man created government from his private property that is not in a United States of America Possession or Territory. “the free inhabitants of each of these States,..” Article IV. Articles of Confederation of November 15, 1777.

13. Defendant has a natural right to a common law remedy with all issues related to his acts, private property, land, independent of written law. “the free inhabitants of each of these States,..” Article IV. Articles of Confederation of November 15, 1777.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The record shows that Appellant has never waived his rights as a native born, free inhabitant, on the Land called Nebraska, and never consented to governance by written law as related to this subject case.  Appellant was found guilty of 18 violations of the Omaha City Code (referenced above) on September 3, 2009. Appellant was found not guilty of Entering a Structure after Posting of Appropriate Notice under Omaha City Code Section 48-81.   On September 17, 2009, Appellant was sentenced to serve a term of 180 days for the Failure to Comply with Notice of Violation charges and the Having an Unsafe Structure charges, all of which were to run concurrently (449:12-15). Appellant was also sentenced to serve 180 days on each of the Obstruction of a Law Enforcement Officer charges, the Resisting Arrest charge, and the Giving False Information charge, which were to run concurrently with one another and consecutively to the 180 day sentences for Unsafe Structure and Failure to Comply with Notice Charges (449:15-19). Appellant was given credit for 0 days served (449:24-450:2). The facts presented at trial are as follows:    On April 9, 2009, Officer Kevin Collins was summoned to the Douglas County Courthouse by Housing Code Enforcement to give a citation to Appellant for housing code violations (126:17-20), which included twelve counts of Failure to Comply with Notice of Violation, two counts of Having an Unsafe Structure, and one count of Entering a Structure after Posting of Appropriate Notice. Officer Collins attempted to write Appellant a citation but Appellant gave his full Christian name, Paul John, when asked for his last name, as Appellant always refers to “Hansen” as a sur-name, and was accused of failing to provide a physical address (127:5-128:11), even though no law requires one to have an address. For these acts, Appellant was also cited for Obstruction of a Law Enforcement Officer and Giving False Information. Officer Collins told Appellant that Appellant was under arrest but allowed Appellant to remain in the courtroom in order to finish unrelated business.  Several hours later on April 9, 2009, Officer Hansen received an assignment to arrest Appellant once Appellant was finished with his unrelated courtroom business. Officer Hansen was assigned this duty because Officer Collins was going off-duty (138:2-7). When Officer Hansen was asked how he came into contact with Appellant, Officer Hansen testified, “We actually passed by [one another] just outside the courtroom doors five plus hours later. And the bailiff inside the courtroom pointed to [Appellant]” (138:16-20). When Officer Hansen was asked what he did next he testified, “I turned and Mr. Hansen handed his brief case to an associate he was with and ran into the stairwell” (13 8:22-23). Noting Paul’s witness testified there was no exchange of any briefcase, and Appelant was arrested with brief case in his possession. Once Officer Hansen got to the stairwell, the Appellant was “nowhere to be seen, (as Appelant walked up the stairs and Officer Hansen ran down the stairs) so Officer Hansen radioed the Douglas County Sheriffs (139:3-4). Deputy Jacob Ritonya heard the call and proceeded into the stairwell (147:2-11). Deputy Ritonya found Appellant in the stairwell and placed him under arrest without incident (148:4-19). Appellant’s flight caused officers to cite Appellant for Resisting Arrest and a second Obstruction of a Law Enforcement Officer charge.   On April 28, 2009, the 19 above-mentioned charges were filed with the Clerk of the County Court. On May 1, 2009, Appellant entered a plea of not guilty (6:4-5). The presiding judge set trial for August 14, 2009. On August 5th 2009, Appellant filed a Motion for Discovery along with several other motions (117:16-22). On August 14, 2009, Appellant appeared for trial and asked the presiding judge why Appellant was not able to see the exhibits before trial (117:6-10; 155:22-23). The presiding judge informed Appellant that the Motion for discovery had been denied because Appellant “entitled [several different motions] as one motion” (117:19-21). Appellant denied that he entitled his several motions as one motion (117:22), objected to the lumping together of his separate motions (155:22-25), objected to the dismissal of his motions without having an opportunity to speak on them (155:25-156:2), and claimed that the denial of his Motion for Discovery resulted in unfair surprise and a violation of his right to due process of law (156:1-3). Appelant motioned the Court to call upon the Plaintiff to prove up personal jurisdiction several times before the trial day (arraignment) , during the trial, and at sentencing.  The trial proceeded and concluded. At the conclusion of the trial, the presiding judge set a hearing for September 3, 2009, for the announcement of the verdict (378:23-24).    On September 3, 2009, Appellant was found guilty of 18 violations of the Omaha City Code (see above). Appellant was found not guilty of Entering a Structure after Posting of Appropriate Notice. At the conclusion of the hearing, the presiding judge set sentencing for September 17, 2009 (411:13-14).    On September 17, 2009, Appellant was sentenced (see above). Immediately after rendering his sentence, the presiding judge apologized for his conduct at trial. The judge stated, “You, know, I raise my voice, not because I’m angry, because I’ve never been angry with you, just frustrated. Frustrated at the time of trial and frustrated with a lot of things”(449:4-7).    The Notice of Appeal was filed on October 13, 2009, and an Order allowing the Appellant to proceed inform a pauperis was signed by District Court Judge Greg Q. McDermott on October 28, 2009.   An appeal was herd by District Court Judge Hartigan, affirming, an appeal was timely filed with the Nebraska Appeals Court on October 5, 2010, in inform a pauperis, appeal received/accepted on October 7.

The below I to IV are Arguments made by the appointed Public Defender

Brief/Argument on Assignment/ Statements of Errors –ARGUMENT

I. The County Court abused its discretion when it denied Appellant’s Request for Discovery. The County Court never gave a justification of its denial of Appellant’s Request for Discovery. The denial of Appellant’s Request for Discovery unfairly deprived Appellant of his right to a fair trial. On July ₃₀th the Appellant had a hearing in County Court and asked the judge whether his motion for discovery had been received, because it was “very important to [Appellant’s] case” (82:23). The presiding judge stated that she had no such motion in the file (82:16-22).  On August 5, 2009, Appellant’s resubmitted motion for discovery was filed with a number of other motions (117:16-22). On August 14, 2009, Appellant appeared for trial and asked the presiding judge why he was not able to see the exhibits before trial (117:6-10; 155:22-23). The presiding judge informed Appellant that the motion for discovery had been denied because Appellant “entitled [several different motions] as one motion” (117:19-21). Appellant denied that he entitled his several motions as one motion (117:22), objected to the lumping together of his separate motions (155:22-25), objected to the dismissal of his motions without having an opportunity to speak on them (15 5:25-156:2), and claimed that the denial of his motion for discovery resulted in unfair surprise and a violation of his right to due process of law (156:1-3). Discovery in a criminal case is generally, and in the absence of a constitutional requirement, controlled by either a statute or court rule. State v. Kinney, 262 Neb. 812, 635 N.W.2d 449 (2001). In Nebraska, NeW Rev. Stat § 29-1912 controls discovery, and it states that when a defendant is charged with a misdemeanor under a city ordinance and makes a request for discovery:  (2)The court may issue such an order pursuant to the provisions of this section. In the exercise of its judicial discretion, the court shall consider among other things whether:  (a) The request is material to the preparation of the defense; (b) The request is not made primarily for the purpose of harassing the prosecution or its witnesses;  (c) The request, if granted, would not unreasonably delay the trial of the offense and an earlier request by the defendant could not have reasonably been made; (d) There is no substantial likelihood that the request, if granted, would preclude a just determination of the issues at the trial of the offense; or  (e) The request, if granted, would not result in the possibility of bodily harm to, or coercion of, witnesses.

(3) Whenever the court refuses to grant an order pursuant to the provisions of this section, it shall render its findings in writing together with the facts upon which the findings are based. While a defendant does not by law have a right to discovery, the court must not abuse its discretion when denying a discovery request. State v. Phelps, 241 Neb. 707, 490 N.W.2d 676 (1992). A judicial abuse of discretion exists when the reasons or rulings of a trial court are clearly untenable, thereby unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial right or a just result in matters properly submitted for judicial disposition. State v. Mantich, 249 Neb. 311, 543 N.W.2d 181 (1996).   The County Court abused its discretion by summarily dismissing Appellant’s Request for Discovery, since it is untenable to dismiss a Request for Discovery on the sole basis that it was submitted with other motions. According to Neb. Rev. Stat § 29-1912(2), submitting a Request for Discovery along with other motions is not a relevant criterion for denying a Request for Discovery. Additionally, it does not appear that the trial court ever reduced its denial into writing as required by Neb. Rev. Stat § 29-1912(3). Furthermore, after being alerted on August 14, 2009, to the fact that Appellant intended the Request for Discovery to be a separate motion, the County Court’s failure to review the denial of the Request for Discovery was an abuse of discretion. The County Court should have reviewed the motions independently once Appellant alerted the County Court that the Request for Discovery was intended as a separate motion. Appellants Motion for Discovery was material to the preparation of his defense, had no harassing effect on the prosecution,  created no unreasonably delay, was accompanied by an earlier request that was lost in the mail or the clerks office, would not have preclude a just determination, would have not resulted in the possibility of bodily harm to, or coercion of, witnesses, and the denial was not render as findings “in writing” together with the facts upon which the findings are based.

The County Court’s denial of Appellant’s Request for Discovery and its failure to review the denial deprived Appellant of substantial rights, including Appellant’s right to a fair trial. Thus, the County Court erred, creating a substantive due process violation, thus lost subject matter jurisdiction and it’s ruling is a nullity.

II.       The County Court erred when it convicted Appellant for Giving False Information because Appellant believed the information to be true. Since the crime of Giving False Information requires knowledge of the falsity, the Appellant did not have requisite mental state to support the conviction.  Essentially no false information was given. The County Court convicted the Appellant for Giving False Information on the basis of testimony from Officer Kevin Collins. Officer Collins testified that on April 9, 2009, he was summoned to the courthouse by Housing Code Enforcement to give a citation to Appellant for housing code violations (126:17-20). Apparently, Appellant was in court attending to business unrelated to matters pertaining to this appeal. Officer Collins testified that when he approached Appellant he informed Appellant that a citation would be issued to him. Next, Officer Collins asked the Appellant to state Appellant’s last name (127:5-14). According to Officer Collins, the Appellant responded, “John” (127:13-24). When asked by Officer Collins for a mailing address, the Appellant “kept giving me a U.S. post officer number” (128:5-10). Officer Collins then told Appellant, “I can’t use that, I have to have a physical address” (128:5-10). According to Officer Collins the Appellant “wouldn’t give it to [Officer Collins]” (128:11). Based on these facts, there was insufficient evidence for the County Court to convict Appellant for Giving False Information under the Omaha City code Section 20-26. Omaha City Code Section 20-26 makes it “unlawful for any person to give any information to a police officer, fireman or other city official, knowing that such information is false.” None of Appellant’s responses to Officer Collins contained information that Appellant knew to be false, or were proven to be false. Appellant’s response of “John” when Officer Collins asked Appellant for Appellant’s last name was not false. According to Appellant’s conception of his identity, Appellant’s name is “Paul John” and he is from the family “Hansen.” Throughout the course of Appellant’s pretrial hearing, trial, and sentencing, Appellant has consistently represented himself to the court as “Paul John” (24:1 5-18; 94:20-22). At Appellant’s arraignment for the charges concerning this appeal, Appellant stated he did not recognize the name “Paul J. Hansen” on the docket (24:20-21) Appellant’s signature on all court documents shows a semicolon between “Paul John” and “Hansen.” Appellant only responds with his last name when he is asked for his family name, surname (24:15-18).   Merriam-Webster Definition of SURNAME- 1 : an added name derived from occupation or other circumstance : nickname 2 : the name borne in common by members of a family. Therefore, when Officer Collins asked for Appellant’s last name and Appellant responded with “John,” Appellant was truthfully answering the question in accordance with his conception of what a last name is based on Webster’s Dictionary. Since Appellant responded honestly according to his definition of “last name,” Appellant did not have give information that he knew to be false, which is required by the Omaha City Code for a Giving False Information conviction. Appellant’s conception of identity and surnames is admittedly unique specific as defined in popular dictionaries and possibly difficult for some people to comprehend, nonetheless 100% accurate. However, the only relevant inquiry is into the mental state of the Appellant. Appellant unwaveringly asserts that his last name is “John” and that “Hansen” is the family he is from and not his last name. Knowing the fact that Hansen is his family name and can not be his last name. For if in fact it is his family name how can it be his last name at the same time. Thus, there was insufficient evidence for the County Court to convict Appellant for False Information for his response of “John.”  No false information equals no cause for an arrest. Appellant’s second response to Officer Collins contained no falsity either. Officer Collins asked Appellant for an address. Appellant kept giving a U.S. post office box. When Officer Collins told Appellant that a U.S. post office box was not a sufficient address, the Appellant was accused of “refusing to give [a permanent address]” (128:11). The testimony from Officer Collins failed to show any falsity relating to these statements. There was no testimony that Appellant did not have access to the U.S. post office box that he recited to Officer Collins. While the Appellant’s response to Officer Collins was not the precise answer desired by Officer Collins, there is no evidence that the response contained any falsity.  There is no known law that a private person must have a residential address, and that a mailing location is not an acceptable, honest, answer. Since neither of Appellant’s responses contained information that Appellant knew, or were proven, to be false, the Appellant’s conviction for False Information was not supported by the evidence, and thus in error.

III.      The County Court erred when it convicted Appellant for Obstruction of a Law Enforcement Officer because Appellant’s acts were not done with the intent to interfere with Officer Collins’ official duties.

The County Court convicted the Appellant for Obstruction of a Law Enforcement Officer on the basis of testimony from Officer Kevin Collins. Officer Collins testified that on April 9, 2009, he was summoned to the courthouse by Housing Code Enforcement to give a citation to Appellant for housing code violations (126:17-20). Apparently, Appellant was in court attending to business unrelated to matters pertaining to this appeal. Officer Collins asked the Appellant to state his last name (127:5-14). According to Officer Collins, the Appellant said, “John” (127:13-24). When asked by Officer Collins for a mailing address, the Appellant “kept giving me a U.S. post office number” (128:11).  Based on these facts, there was insufficient evidence for the County Court to convict the Appellant for Obstructing a Law Enforcement Officer under the Omaha City Code Section 20-21. Omaha City Code Section 20-21 makes it “unlawful for any person to purposefully or knowingly do any act, refuse to do any act, or to commit an act of omission with the intent to obstruct or interfere with any law enforcement officer or firefighter performing an official duty.” None of the Appellant’s responses or non-responsive silences to Officer Collins’ questions were done with the “intent to obstruct or interfere with any law enforcement… duty.”  Appellant’s response of “John” when asked by Officer Collins for his last name was not uttered with the intent to obstruct Officer Collin’s duties. As delineated in Argument IV, the Appellant has a peculiar way of understanding surnames. Since Appellant never had the intent to obstruct the duties of Officer Collins when uttering “John,” his response cannot support a conviction for obstruction. Paul John of the family Hansen is a full precise identification, and the fact that Paul was in court it is absurd that he would try and hide his identity.  The Officers response was impulsive and without thought.  Appellant’s second response to Officer Collins was not uttered with the intent to obstruct Officer Collins’ duties either. When Officer Collins asked Appellant for his address, Appellant gave a U.S. post office box address several times. When Officer Collins told Appellant that a U.S. post office box was not a sufficient address, the Appellant “refused to give it” (128:11). The testimony from Officer Collins failed to show that Appellant gave these responses with the intent to obstruct Officer Collins’ duties. There was no testimony that Appellant recited the U.S. post office box after he was told by Officer Collins that a U.S. post office box was unacceptable. Instead, Officer Collins testimony stated that when asked for an address he “kept giving me [a] U.S. post office box number” (128:9). Surely, repetition of the address was not meant to obstruct Officer Collins, since Appellant may have been repeating the address so that Officer Collins could write down the address. According to Officer Collins’ testimony, once Officer Collins informed Appellant that a U.S. post office box was unacceptable, Appellant “refused to give it to me” (128:11). Since Officer Collins did not specify how Appellant refused, it should be presumed that Appellant responded with silence. While silence can constitute obstruction, it is not clear why Appellant was silent. Appellant may not have understood the question or he may not have had an address that was not a U.S. post office box. While the silence may have obstructed the duties of Officer Collins, it was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant’s silence was intended by the Appellant to obstruct the duties of Officer Collins.  Appellant gave the only address he had associated with his life at that point in time.  The truth can not be converted into a crime.  Since neither the Appellant’s response of “John,” the Appellant’s repetition of his U.S. K post office box, or the Appellant’s silence was proven beyond a reasonable doubt to be given by Appellant with the intent of obstructing the duties of Officer Collins, the County Court’s conviction for Obstruction of a Law Enforcement Officer was not supported by the evidence, and was thus in error.  Appellant gave an address just as he was asked to give, that being the only address he used, to give a different answer would have been a false address.  Appellants truthful statements did not warrant an arrest.

IV. The County Court erred in convicting Appellant of Obstruction of Law Enforcement because Appellant was not under arrest when he entered the stairwell.  In order for the act of flight to constitute the crime of Obstruction of a Law Enforcement Officer, there must be a command not to flee. Appellant was not given a command by Officer Paul, so he was free to leave via the stairwell.

The County Court erred in convicting the Appellant for Obstruction of a Law Enforcement Officer on the basis of the testimony of Officer Gregory Hansen. Officer Hansen testified that on April 9, 2009, he received an assignment to cite the Appellant, due to the fact that Officer Collins was going off-duty (13 8:2-7). When Officer Hansen was asked how he came into contact with the Appellant, Officer Hansen testified, “We actually passed [by one another] just outside the courtroom doors. And the bailiff inside the courtroom pointed to [Appellant]” (138:16-20). Officer Hansen was then asked, “And what did you do in response to that” (138:21). In response, Officer Hansen testified, “I turned and Mr. Hansen handed his brief case to an associate he was with and ran into the stairwell” (138:22-23). Note- Seybert testified that no briefcase was passed. (276:8-15) Once Officer Hansen got to the stairwell, the Appellant was “nowhere to be seen” so Officer Hansen radioed the Douglas County Sheriffs (139:3-4). Deputy Jacob Ritonya heard the call and proceeded into the stairwell (147:2-11). Deputy Ritonya found the Appellant in the stairwell and placed him under arrest without incident (148:4-19).

Based on these facts, there was insufficient evidence for the County Court to convict the Appellant for Obstructing a Law Enforcement Officer under the Omaha City Code Section 20-21. Omaha City Code Section 20-21 makes it “unlawful for any person to purposefully or knowingly do any act, refuse to do any act, or to commit an act of omission with the intent to obstruct or interfere with any law enforcement officer or firefighter performing an official duty. “Running away from officers has been held to be a violation of Obstruction of a Peace Officer”  NelxRev.St. ~ 28-906(1) (Reissue 2008), which is analogous to Obstructing a Law Enforcement Officer under the Omaha City Code Sec. 20-21. State v. Ellingson, 13 Neb.App. 931, 703 N.W.2d 273 (2005).

While fleeing is enough to constitute obstruction, there seems to be an implicit requirement that the Officer must attempt an arrest. Although Nebraska Appellate Courts have not expressly stated that an attempt to arrest is a requirement for flight to constitute obstruction, there are several reasons to believe that the requirement exists. First, without an attempt to arrest by the officer the arrestee can not form the mental state that is required for the commission of the crime. Secondly, an attempt to arrest is an essential element of the offense of fleeing in a motor vehicle under Neb.Rev.St. ~ 2 8-905, which is essentially the same as obstruction through flight, just minus the car. State v. Claussen, 276 Neb. 630, 756 N.W.2d 163 (2008). Thirdly, numerous other jurisdictions have made an attempt to arrest an essential element to an Obstruction of a Law Enforcement Officer prosecution. E.A.B. v. State, 851 So.2d 308, 311 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). Porter v. State, 224 Ga. App. 276, 279, 480 S.E2d 291, 294 (1997). Finally, without an attempt to arrest requirement, our right to privacy is meaningless, since an Officer could apprehend any person for obstruction anytime the person moves in the opposite direction of law enforcement.  Officer Hansen never attempted to arrest the Appellant, which is a necessary element for a prosecution of Obstruction of a Law Enforcement Officer that is based on flight. According to Officer Hansen’s testimony, he turned toward the Appellant and the Appellant ran into the stairwell (138:22-23). Once Officer Hansen got to the stairwell, the Appellant was “nowhere to be seen” (139:3-4). Based on this testimony, Officer Hansen never communicated to the Appellant that he was under arrest. The only attempt to arrest the Appellant was given aprox. five hours earlier by Officer Collins, who told Appellant “consider yourself under arrest and that I [Officer Collins] will be back” (128:21-23). Given the several hours that had elapsed since Officer Collins’ order, the freedom that Appellant enjoyed during this time, and the fact that Officer Collins did not show up to arrest the Appellant, Officer Collins’ acts can hardly be considered an effective attempt to arrest to support an Obstruction conviction based on flight. Newton v. Hoffman, 10 Neb.App. 390, 632 N.W.2d 344 (2001) (holding that arrest is based on the totality of the circumstances as understood by a reasonable person).

Since Officer Hansen never attempted to arrest Appellant, Appellant was free to leave the scene in any manner Appellant so chose. Without any legally sufficient evidence of an attempt to arrest, which is necessary to support an Obstruction of Law Enforcement based on flight, the County Court’s conviction for Obstruction of a Law Enforcement Officer was not supported by the evidence, and thus in error.  How is it an Police Officer can tell someone he is under arrest, leaves him for five hours, then this same man walks by a completely different Officer and does not even recognize the man he is looking for, and gets accused of fleeing. Note- Appellant’s witness testified that Appellant did not hand any briefcase to him nor was he running as he went into the stairway. (276:8-15) This Officer is attempting to stack charges without cause.

V.  The County Court erred in convicting Appellant for Resisting Arrest because Appellant was not under arrest when he entered the stairwell. In order for the act of flight to constitute Resisting Arrest there must be a command not to flee. Appellant was not given a command by Officer Hansen, so he was free to leave via the stairwell.

The County Court convicted Appellant for Resisting Arrest on the basis of testimony from Officer Gregory Hansen. Officer Hansen testified that on April 9, 2009, he received an assignment to cite Appellant, due to the fact that Officer Collins was going off-duty (138:2-7). When Officer Hansen was asked how he came into contact with Appellant, Officer Hansen testified, “We actually passed [by one another] just outside the courtroom doors. And the bailiff inside the courtroom pointed to [Appellant)” (138:16-20). Officer Hansen was then asked, “And what did you do in response to that” (138:2 1). In response, Officer Hansen testified, “I turned and Mr. Hansen handed his briefcase to an associate he was with and ran into the stairwell” (13 8:22-23). Once Officer Hansen got to the stairwell, the Appellant was “nowhere to be seen” so Officer Hansen radioed the Douglas County Sheriffs (139:3-4). Deputy Jacob Ritonya heard the call and proceeded into the stairwell (147:2-11). Deputy Ritonya found Appellant in the stairwell and placed him under arrest without incident (148 :4-19).

Based on these facts, there was insufficient evidence for the County Court to convict Appellant for Resisting Arrest under the Omaha City Code Section 20-22. Omaha City Code Section 20-22 makes it “unlawful for any person arrested by a police officer, or by any person vested with authority to arrest, to resist arrest.” An attempt to arrest is an express requirement of Omaha City Code Section 20-22.  Officer Hansen never attempted to arrest Appellant. According to Officer Hansen’s testimony, he turned toward Appellant and claimed Appellant ran into the stairwell (138:22-23). Once Officer Hansen got to the stairwell, Appellant was “nowhere to be seen” (139:3-4). Based on this testimony, Officer Hansen never communicated to Appellant that he was under arrest. The only attempt to arrest Appellant was given aprox. five hours earlier by Officer Collins, who told Appellant “consider yourself under arrest and that I [Officer Collins] will be back” (128:21-23). Given the fact that several hours had elapsed since Officer Collins’ order, the relative freedom that Appellant enjoyed during this time, and the fact that Officer Collins did not show up to arrest Appellant, Officer Collins’ acts can hardly be considered an effective attempt to arrest to support the Resisting Arrest conviction. Newton v. Huffman, 10 Neb.App. 390, 632 N.W.2d 344 (2001) (holding that arrest is based on the totality of the circumstances as understood by a reasonable person).    Since Officer Hansen never attempted to arrest Appellant, Appellant can not be convicted of Resisting Arrest. An attempt to arrest is a necessary element for a Resisting Arrest conviction. Due to the fact that there was no evidence presented that Officer Hansen attempted to arrest Appellant, the County Court’s conviction for Resisting Arrest was not supported by the evidence, and thus in error.  The Officer never said “STOP”, never said anything, no order, no response was given for no duty was created.

VI. The County Court’s sentence of 14 concurrent sentences of 6 months to run consecutively to 4 concurrent sentences of 6 months was excessive. The court did not properly take into consideration the Timmens’ factors of the nature of the offense and the amount of violence involved in the commission of the offense. State v. Timmens, 263 Neb. 622, 631, 641 N.W.2d 383, 391 (2002). The judge erred when he was influenced by irrelevant information such as Appellant’s pro se representation and unique trial tactics. State v. Pattno, 254 Neb. 733. 579 N.W.2d 503 (1998). An Appellate Court will not disturb a sentence imposed that is within the statutory limits unless the sentencing court has abused its discretion. State v. Hurbenca, 266 Neb. 853, 865, 669 N.W.2d 668, 676 (2003). An abuse of discretion takes place when the sentencing court’s reasons or rulings are untenable and unfairly deprive the defendant of a substantial right and a just result. State v. Segura, 265 Neb. 903, 909, 660 N.W.2d 512, 5 17-18 (2003). Where a sentence imposed within statutory limits is alleged on appeal to be excessive, the appellate court must determine whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in considering and applying circumstantial factors as well as any applicable legal principles in determining the sentence to be imposed. State v. Miller, 11 Neb. App. 404,411,651 N.W.2d 594, 600 (2002). Furthermore, actions of the sentencing court, which are clearly against justice, reason, or evidence, constitute an abuse of discretion. State v. Harrison, 255 Neb. 990, 1001, 588 N.W.2d 556, 562 (1999). In part, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2308 (Reissue 2008) provides: In all criminal cases that now are, or may hereafter be pending in the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court, the appellate court may reduce the sentence rendered by the District Court against the accused when, in its opinion, the sentence is excessive, and it shall be the duty of the appellate court to render such sentences against the accused as in its opinion may be warranted by the evidence.  The Nebraska Supreme Court has listed factors that control any sentence imposed by the District Court: In imposing a sentence, a judge should consider the defendant’s age, mentality, education, experience, and social and cultural background, as well as his or her past criminal record or law-abiding conduct, motivation for the offense, nature of the offense, and the amount of violence involved in the commission of the crime. State v. Timmens, 263 Neb. 622, 631, 641 N.W.2d 383, 391 (2002).  The Nebraska Supreme Court made clear in Pattno that, “Due Process requires that Sentencing judges consider only relevant information as the basis for a sentence.” State v. Pattno, 254 Neb. 733, 741, 579 N.W.2d 503 (1998) (citing State v. Clear, 236 Neb. 648, 463 N.W.2d 581 (1990). In the present case, Appellant was convicted of 18 misdemeanors under the city ordinance. Appellant received the maximum sentence of 6 months for all misdemeanors. Appellant was sentenced to serve 14 of these sentences concurrently with one another, and four of these sentences concurrently with one another. Furthermore, Appellant was sentence to serve the 13 concurrent sentences consecutively to the 4 concurrent sentences. The County Court abused its discretion when it administered this excessive sentence to Appellant because it did not consider the relevant Timmens’ factors such as the nature of the offense or the amount of violence involved in the commission of the offense. The judge’s failure to consider these factors is not surprising considering that he was clearly aggravated by the legal arguments presented by Appellant. When considering the nature of the offense and the amount of violence involved in the commission of the crimes as set forth in Timmens, the evidence supports a lesser sentence. The record does not show that there was any violence involved in any of the charges levied against Appellant. Fourteen of the charges that Appellant was convicted for were housing code violations. The other four charges of which Appellant was convicted arose out of complications surrounding the citation process. If the non-violent nature of these convictions were properly taken into account, Appellant’s sentences would be substantially less severe.  The judge’s failure to fully consider the relevant Timmens’ factors was likely due to his bias toward Appellant. Throughout the course of the trial, the presiding judge was aggravated by Appellant’s arguments. At times, the presiding judge would make comments mocking and demeaning Appellant’s arguments and defenses. For example, the presiding judge instructed Appellant to move on to “his next obvious question with an answer” and informed Appellant that he was making “a great assumption” (emphasis added) (108:9-17). Appellant requested that the presiding judge recuse himself due to his “coarse attitude” but the presiding judge refused Appellant’s request (118:17-22). Perhaps the presiding judge realized that his demeanor gave the sense of impropriety, since he felt it necessary to explain his attitude toward the Appellant immediately after sentencing. Immediately after sentencing the presiding judge stated, “You know, I raise my voice, not because I’m angry, because I’ve never been angry with you, just frustrated. Frustrated at the time of trial and frustrated with a lot of things” (449:4-7).  Pattno made clear that due process prevents a court from considering information that is not relevant to sentencing. Timmens does not set out as a relevant factor for sentencing the Appellant’s annoying arguments or tortured logic. By allowing Appellant’s representation of himself to influence the judge, the court overstepped its boundaries and violated Appellant’s due process rights. The judge was likely unable to consider relevant mitigating factors, since the judge was obviously aggravated by Appellant’s decision to represent himself and utilize a novel trial strategy. Appellant’s decision to represent himself and implement unique trial tactics are irrelevant factors that should not have been taken into account under Pattno. If the judge had properly considered only the relevant factors found in Timmens he would have sentenced Appellant to a lesser sentence because the crimes involved here did not involve any violence.  According to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-23 08 (Reissue 2008), “The appellate court may reduce the sentence rendered by the District Court…, when in its opinion the sentence is excessive… The appellate courts must recognize that sentencing courts are subject to human error and fallibility, and thus can impose unconscionable, unreasonable, and untenable sentences, even if those sentences are “within statutory limits.” The mitigating factors set out by the Nebraska Supreme Court are a clear message that a sentence within statutory limits may still be excessive. Simply put, in determining an appropriate sentence, the court must consider, in each case, the nature of the offense and the situation of the offender. However, the court must not consider factors that are not relevant to sentencing, which would include Appellant’s decision to represent himself and employ his legal arguments. In this case, the District Court abused its discretion by being influenced by these irrelevant factors. The District Court’s sentences must be modified to ensure that Appellant is not unfairly deprived of a substantial right and a just result.    NARROW CONSTRUCTION OF PENAL STATUTES Penal statutes are narrowly construed. If there is fair doubt as to whether the act charged and proved is embraced within the prohibition, that doubt will be resolved in favor of the accused. The Doctrine of Lenity, ((Leniency)) a subcategory of this canon, provides that “ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.” It “gives a criminal defendant the benefit of a lesser penalty where there is an ambiguity in the statute allowing for more than one interpretation.”

The below 1a.,2a, “A”to”Q” are arguments that were refused to

be added by the appointed Public Defender upon Paul’s Demand:

Additional to argument #1a, denial of discovery:

Paul had no clue to what consisted alleged violation; he only had an information of some dated alleged ‘Notice of Violation’.  Impossible to prepare a defense with no specific as to acts alleged.  How can one subpoena witness to aid in a defense with no specific acts. Discovery is ‘due’ to find specifics, then for aid in selecting specific witnesses and counter exhibits.  Paul had no clue to when or what act he was alleged to have done as with alleged resisting arrest, giving of false information, obstructing. It is impossible to prepare a defense with no specific as to acts alleged. In order to prepare a defense Paul needed the following:  resisting arrest- what do they claim I did, where did I do it, to whom, who witnessed it, was it what I did or was it something I refused to do. How can I compare it to the statute with out specifics? How can I seek council without specifics?  What words of false information, was with address, name, or body politic affiliation.  I needed this discovery before trial. Discovery is a right, not a privilege.

United States Equal Protection Clause, Fourteenth Amendment / limitation to the United

States Constitution;  Sec.1, “without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”  Nebraska Constitution, Art.1, CI-3 “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”  ALSO-Discovery is a common-law right of Paul’s. (Case law not necessary.)   NOTE- Paul has a superior standing than a US citizen, as the record shows my un-rebutted status of native-born Nebraska man, thus not a statutory person. (100:17:19).    “Due process of law in a criminal case includes right to trial by jury and right to defend in person or by counsel.” Johnson v. State, 169 Neb. 783, 100 N.W.2d 844 (1960).    “The Constitution guarantees a fair and impartial trial to every person accused of crime, and that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor shall he be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” Coxbill v. State, 115 Neb. 634, 214 N.W. 256 (1927).

Additional to argument #2a, alleged as to give false information to an officer:

An Omaha Police Employee is not a constitutional officer.

1. He is not elected, but is hired upon qualifications.    2. He has no tenure of office, only has a right to work.    3. Holds no official (officer) authority by the Nebraska Constitution, or the US

Constitution.    4. Is only a statutory policy enforcer.  Again, Paul is not informed in the information of facts alleged as to what Paul said that was false. Information is defective / vague and is therefore not constitutional notice.  “test of sufficiency of the indictment or information is whether it contains all essential elements of offense as set out in statute and clearly apprises defendant of fact constituting the offense”. State v. Simpson, 846 S.W. 2d 724 (Mo.1993); State v. Quigley 829 S.W. 2d 117(Mo.App.1992) (.I trust I could pay to find a like case in the US, and

Nebraska courts, if need be on further appeal.)  Paul being bared from discovery and nothing specific in the ‘information’, he lacks notice, therefore a “due process violation”.

Paul knows not if the alleged statement was given at arrest at court house stairway, or

6.5 hours before in court room, or during booking. Common sense, common justice

demands such specific notice before being given six months jail time with all the social

and financial destruction included. An information which omits a statutory element of the charged offense is constitutionally defective because it fails to state an offense.  See as follows:  The information must apprise the defendant of the elements of the crime charged and the conduct of the defendant which is alleged to have constituted that crime and when information(s ) are defective the charges must be dismissed.  See the following:  “The substantial rights which both an indictment or information are designed to further are to inform the defendant of the charges against him so that he may adequately prepare a defense and to protect the defendant against double jeopardy.”  State v. Simpson, 846 S.W. 2d 724 (Mo.1993); State v. Quigley 829 S.W. 2d 117 (Mo.App.1992.  “In State v. Holt, 104 Wn.2d 315, 321, 704 P.2d 1189 (1985), the Washington Supreme Court held that an information which omits a statutory element of the charged offense is constitutionally defective because it fails to state an offense. In State v. Leach, 113 Wn.2d 679, 687, 782 P.2d 552 (1989), the Supreme Court

expanded its holding in Holt and held that, like an information or complaint, a citation

must state an offense. . . . In a recent opinion, the Supreme Court held that

the essential elements rule, discussed in State v. Leach, 113 Wn.2d 679, 782 P.2d 552

(1989), applies to citations. Seattle v. Hein, 115 Wn.2d 555, 799 P.2d 734 (1990). . . . in State v. Robinson, 58 Wn. App. 599, 606, 794 P.2d 1293 (1990) (per curiam) the court reversed a fourth degree assault conviction where the citation charged the petitioner with a violation of “9A. 36.041 Assault 4th on police officer). The court reasoned that because the citation did not contain an essential element of the crime, i.e., the non-statutory element of intent, it failed to state a charge on which the petitioner could be tried and convicted. Robinson, 58 Wn. App. At 606-07. . . . As the Leach court pointed out, although the CRRLJ provide efficient procedures

for initiating misdemeanor prosecutions, they do not circumvent the constitutional requirement that a citation must apprise a defendant with reasonable certainty of the nature of the accusations against him. 113 Wn.2d at 695-98. . .   In contrast, complaints are issued by a prosecutor who is not present at the scene. Leach, 113 Wn.2d at 698. Thus, the prosecutor must define the crime more specifically to assist a defendant in determining the incident the complaint addresses.

Leach, 113 Wn.2d at 698.”  See Auburn v. Brooke, 60 Wn.App. 87, 803 P.2d 1235 (1991).  The Constitutional Requirement of Notice is the Same for Both Complaints and Citations First, the allegations are not in the indictment and that’s fatal. Second, it’s not “legally” sufficient to just make allegations, those allegations must be based on facts; those facts must establish where, when, why and how the false information was conveyed and what it specifically consisted of. For one to accuse one of false information after talking with them at length and then not stating specifically what it was that was deemed false is most unreasonable.

And if facts are alleged (evidence), then they must be based on the testimony of witnesses with personal knowledge, Rule 602 Federal Rules of Evidence.  When Paul was in court it is absolutely absurd that Paul would even attempt to hid his identity. Saying Paul John is what I am called, and Hansen is my family name from my fathers side is a clear lawful identification, to which many utilize to avoid association with a legal, “statutory person” recognized name.  It is material when it affects whether the defendant received adequate notice from the information and it is prejudicial when it affects the defendant’s ability to adequately defend against the charges in the information and those given to the jury in the instructions. Turner v State, 892 S.W.2d 737 (Mo.App.1994).  “Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.” Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 514 (1869).

[New] Error Arguments #A, All Following Charging Statutes are vague, therefore unconstitutional as applied; (See Included Forwarded Certified Copies of each charging statute)  Failure to Comply with Notice of Violation, as in Count No. 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 22, 12, 14, and 15.    Sec. 48-53.  Prosecution of violation.  (General Penalties 1-10)  Any person failing to comply with a section of this code or with a notice of violation or order served in accordance with this code shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and be punished as provided in section 1-10 of the Omaha Municipal Code. The filing or pendency of an appeal under this code shall not stay the criminal prosecution of any violation. If the notice of violation is not complied with, the code official may also, in addition to the penalties set out in section 1-10 of this Code, institute the appropriate proceeding at law or in equity to restrain, correct or abate such violation, or to require the removal or termination of the unlawful occupancy of the structure in violation of the provisions of this code or of the order or direction made pursuant thereto.(Ord. No. 36379, § 2, 9-16-03; Ord. No. 37950, § 3, 1-8-08) Having an Unsafe Structure, as in Count No. 4, 13, Sec. 48-71. (a.) General. When a structure or equipment is found by the code official to be unsafe, or when a structure is found unfit for human occupancy, or is found

unlawful, such structure shall be declared as such by notice pursuant to the provisions of this code. (1)Unsafe structures. An unsafe structure is one that is found to be dangerous to the life, health, property or safety of the public or the occupants of the structure by not providing minimum safeguards to protect or warn occupants in the event of fire, or because such structure contains unsafe equipment or is so damaged, decayed, dilapidated, structurally unsafe, or of such faulty construction or unstable foundation, that partial or complete collapse is possible.

Sec. 1-2.  Definitions and rules of construction. Person: The word “person” shall include and be applied to a firm, partnership, association, corporation, organization, club, society, group acting as a unit, political subdivision or body politic and corporate, as well as to an individual.

Paul demanded his right to have Plaintiff prove up ‘personal jurisdiction’ timely.

The above codes are clearly statutory and are to be applied to a ‘person’ as defined in

Sec. 1-2 (See Sec. 1-2, above, definition of “Person”, and certified copy forwarded to this Court)   The Plaintiff had a legal and lawful duty to prove on the record and the court had a duty to write or possibly communicate what it has received from Plaintiff as to prove up personal jurisdiction as challenged.  With no findings given to Paul’s motion (121:22-25 and 122:1-10) by the Court as required the County Court lost jurisdiction / authority to proceed. Such finding are required by law, a breach of law by the court is a constitutional violation, as a due process violation.  It was due ME.  Upon reading the charging information and statutes Paul has right to place the proof

on the moving party if in [fact] he (Paul) is “included” in the class the code is to be applied.  “Everyone knows” is not acceptable; this Defendant has/had a right to cross examine all offers of proof.  The judgment is void for lack of this said substantives right.  Charging Information, Obstructing Administration Of Law Sec. 20-21., and False Information Sec. 20-26, and Sec. 20-22, are all associate with a “person”, person as in definitions – Sec. 1-2.  Definitions and rules of construction. Person: The word “person” shall include and be applied to a firm, partnership, association, corporation, organization, club, society, group acting as a unit, political subdivision or body politic and corporate, as well as to an individual. (SEE Forwarded Certified Copies of this section, also for the below municipal codes.) Sec. 20-21.  Obstructing law enforcement officer or firefighter.  It shall be unlawful for any “person” to purposefully or knowingly do any act, refuse to do any act, or to commit an act of omission with the intent to obstruct or

interfere with any law enforcement officer or firefighter performing  official duty.

Sec. 20-22.  Resisting arrest.  It shall be unlawful for any “person” arrested by a police officer, or by any person vested with authority to arrest, to resist arrest.    Sec. 20-26.  Giving false information.  It shall be unlawful for any “person” to give any information to a police officer, fireman or other city official, knowing that such information is false.  The word person is vague and therefore unconstitutional as applied.  It fails to give notice for the fact that the term “person” can not be described by the same word such as “natural person” as it is in the definitions.  Failure to notice due to vagueness can not be notice, no notice can only lead to no code violation.    There is no evidence in the record that Paul is a “person” as defined.  The only

‘one’ term the City claims is “individual”.  The term individual is vague, it must be interpreter as ether a sole entity, or a named corporation, and thus have no relationship to the living man Paul. ejusdem generis (ee-jos-dem jen-o-ris also eejoos- or ee-yoos-). [A Latin Term – “of the same kind or class”]     A canon of construction that when a general word or phrase follows a list of specific persons or things, the general word or phrase will be interpreted to include only persons or things of the same type as those listed.    For example, in the phrase horses, cattle, sheep, pigs, goats, or any other barnyard animal, the general language or any other barnyard animal — despite its seeming breadth — would probably be held to include only four-legged, hoofed

mammals (and thus would exclude chickens).  Person:  The word “person” shall include and be applied to:   <This is from the OMAHA MUNICIPAL CODE, Definition of “PERSON”, Sec. 1-2.  Definitions and rules of construction. Person: The word “person” shall include: a firm,(A legal entity.)  partnership, (A legal entity.) association, (A legal entity.)  corporation, (A legal entity.)  organization, (A legal entity.) club, society, (A legal entity.) group acting as a unit, (A legal entity.) political subdivision, (A legal entity.) or body politic, (A legal entity.)
and corporate, (A legal entity.) as well as to an individual.  (Therefore the term individual is deemed as a legal entity.)  Blacks Law Dictionary 6^{th Edition} page 773, the term “Individual” defined as a noun-  “…that it may, in proper cases, include artificial persons.”  The statutes are vague, a common-law court would/will judge that as true. -“In common usage, the term `person’ does not include the sovereign and statutes employing it will ordinarily not be construed to do so.” – US Supreme Court in U.S. v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258,
67 SCt 677 (1947): -“Since in common usage, the term `person’ does not include the
sovereign, statutes employing the phrase are ordinarily construed to exclude it.” – US Supreme Court in US v. Fox 94 US 315:   “the party seeking to establish the court’s in personam jurisdiction still carries the burden of proof, and the burden does not shift to the party challenging jurisdiction.” Ameritas Inv. Corp. v. McKinney, 269 Neb. 564, 694 N.W.2d 191 (2005)

B. All Charging Statutes and Information(s) lack essential elements of specifics to give constitutional notice;

As discussed above a man like Paul is not specifically included and therefore not

included.  Vagueness voids all criminal information’s / notices.  (282:20-24)

C. Defendant Received no constitutional notice;  Paul did not receive any notice to correct any violation due to the fact that the statute is vague and does not specifically include a man like Paul, Paul being a non-statutory person.  “…due to improper service and lack of actual notice, a court fails to obtain personal jurisdiction over the party in possession of or owning the property being sold.”   Curtis v. Giff, 17 Neb.App. 149, 757 N.W.2d 139, Neb.App.,2008

D. Trial Court refused to reveal its jurisdiction to deny defendant a type of trial by jury;

Court refused to give written or oral findings as to what Plaintiff offered as evidence on

the record to prove personal jurisdiction, this being a substantive due process violation. (10:10 to page 12:15, and 281:13-23).

E. State failed to prove subject property was in the jurisdiction of the corporate STATE OF NEBRASKA;  No evidence is on the record that Paul’s private property was in the jurisdiction of the corporate STATE OF NEBRASKA.  “the party seeking to establish the court’s in personam jurisdiction still carries the burden of proof, and the burden does not shift to the party challenging jurisdiction.” Ameritas Inv. Corp. v. McKinney, 269 Neb. 564, 694 N.W.2d 191 (2005)

F. State failed to prove subject property was in the jurisdiction of the corporate CITY OF OMAHA;  No evidence is on the record that Paul’s private property was in the jurisdiction of the corporate STATE OF NEBRASKA. “the party seeking to establish the court’s in personam jurisdiction still carries the burden of proof, and the burden does not shift to party challenging jurisdiction.” Ameritas Inv. Corp. v. McKinney, 269 Neb. 564, 694 N.W.2d 191 (2005)

G. Court failed to confirm that prosecutor was licensed by the STATE OF NEBRASKA authorities;

H.Court errored to see Defendant had no funds to repair or demo any subject buildings, therefore can not be punished for an impossibility;  Paul notified the court that he had no fund to do any repairs or demolition. (304:11-12)  It is unconstitutional to punish a man for an act it is impossible for him to perform.

[New] Error Arguments # I, Court errored to see that Nebraska statutes chapter 28 does not include a violation of an municipal code as a criminal act;

Chapter 28 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes has no provision in it for the municipal code

to be classed as a criminal charge.  This being purely a law argument, as to a subject

matter jurisdictional challenge.  If the Nebraska Legislature has not constitutional

authority to class said code violations as criminal it in turn then forbidden to pass such

non-existing permission onto this municipal corporation now existing as a metropolitan

city and known as the “City of Omaha” a body corporate and politic.

[New] Error Arguments # J., Court errored in not noticing that no affidavit accompanied the information of a damaged party by the man called Paul John Hansen, as “not” a named corporation. If due process would have been followed, Paul would have exercised his sovereign right as a de jure Citizen, native-born Nebraska man.  Paul then would have forced the

proof of a complaining party, their affidavit, and proof of damage for as to give the court its needed element of personal jurisdiction.  No person can make a criminal complaint upon said man but by affidavit.  Common Law demands this.  No proof is found in the record of Paul being of a privileged class. Paul class of right by birth demands his right of common-law due process.  This DOUGLAS COUNTY court and its aiding county prosecutor railroaded Paul past his common law right on to a statutory privileged venue, or better said the authority to resolve the controversy by an administrative court .  The controversy had no business in a statutory court and said must be resolved in a common law jurisdiction, period.  The statutory court had not ascertained jurisdiction as was its duty.  No evidence was placed on the record that the named

defendant as “Paul J Hansen” is as “not” a named corporation.

K. Court errored when Defendant motioned for Plaintiff to prove up Personal Jurisdiction, with written findings of fact and conclusions of law, to which nothing was placed on the record, nether were findings written into the record. (This error is essentially the same as one of Suder’s list.) The Court error is in not first having Plaintiff prove up personal jurisdiction “on the record” when challenged timely by Paul. (30:22-23 and 33:11-14)

Paul asks for findings of facts and conclusions of law as to said challenge/motion.

(32:25 to 33:1)  Paul noticed the Court that the Prosecutors words can not be evidence

upon Paul’s objected or challenged.  (36:7-9) Paul orally informed the Court of some of the essential elements of personal jurisdiction, and with supporting notice of Case law offered as EXHIBT #1. (36:9-16 and 37:12-14)  Court received EXHIBIT No. 1 (SEE 39a in B.O.E.)  Paul as an untrained layman as to court procedure relies on basic common law efforts to have the court take judicial notice of the case law in said Exhibit No. 1. (37:8-9)  The 8^th Circuit Federal Court clearly notices that personal jurisdiction is a “prerequisite” that meaning Paul had no obligation or could not be compelled against his will to face the pains of trial until the plaintiff meet “FIRST” said prerequisites, and placed them before the court “ON/IN THE RECORD”. (SEE EXHIBIT No. 1 Cases of Kellogg, Sanders, and Hatridge) Simply stated the court gains personal jurisdiction over Paul only through the evidence offered by the Plaintiff, and can not be assumed or upon presumption due to Paul’s timely challenge.  No evidence and no court findings, of personal jurisdiction is found in the record, therefore the County Court lost, or did not gain, personal jurisdiction as is required by law upon Paul’s challenge.   Also it is important that if the court is one of limited jurisdiction, if challenged, the jurisdiction must be proven by the Plaintiff.  Paul also gave noticed to the Judge on the day of trial that evidence of personal jurisdiction has not been placed on the record, and that the court lacks jurisdiction to proceed against Paul. (121:22-25 and 122:1-10)    Paul was forced to face an administrative hearing, denied the protection of a comm.-law trial by a jury.  Substantial due process denied Paul.

As to being denied findings, orally or written, by the court see below:

Paul’s motion for findings, (SEE Motions in file, I never received a copy of them so can not locate them/it for you.), were/are civil in nature.  Any courts determination as to the record of personal jurisdiction is common-law in nature.  The Trial Court is purely statutory, and administrative in nature.  Jurisdiction to apply a municipal code is based on ”privileged class”  on USA territory. Denial of findings for Paul is a due process violation, the court loses jurisdiction, and any judgment of the trial court lacking jurisdiction due to a sustentative due process violation creates only void judgments.  Paul requested finding, court denied findings.  Paul challenges Plaintiff to find requested findings in the record to prove compliance.  Nebr. Revised Statutes  25-1127. Trial by court; general finding; findings of fact; conclusions of law.  Upon the trial of questions of fact by the court, it shall not be necessary for the court to state its finding, except, generally, for the plaintiff or defendant, unless one of the parties request it, with a view of excepting to the decision of the court upon the questions of law involved in the trial; in which case the court shall state in writing the conclusions of fact found separately from the conclusions of law.  Source:R.S.1867, Code § 297, p. 444; R.S.1913, § 7865; C.S.1922, § 8810; C.S.1929, § 20-1127; R.S.1943, § 25-1127.    Paul did timely request findings. (110:9-21)    “The court need only state its finding generally unless one of the parties timely requests conclusions of fact.” Henkle & Joyce Hardware Co. v. Maco, Inc., 195 Neb. 565, 239  N.W.2d 772 (1976).      Special findings are unnecessary unless requested. Bailey v. McCoy, 187 Neb. 618, 193 N.W.2d 270 (1971).    Any future common-law review (trial for damages) will clearly show that the Trial Court and or the Plaintiff denied the record proof of personal jurisdiction for a reason, they had

no proof.  As stated in Paul’s first hand written brief as to personal jurisdiction see the following:  It is important that if the court is one of limited jurisdiction, if challenged, the

jurisdiction must be proven by the Plaintiff.   Paul primary ability to even begin to build a defense is contingent to this knowledge.  The County court made error by denying Paul such essential information. (110:9-21)    One big question is, “what did the Plaintiff offer the Court” that gives force and effect of law why Paul was/is to be subject, to the trial court, an administrative court, and denied his demand for a common law trial by jury as a free inhabitant.  One would think that the Plaintiff can be brought before a court of common law and then be forced to produce the said evidence, and if none can be produced, face judgments for damages, and establish a void judgment with this original case.   Authorities of case law “While the plaintiffs bear the ultimate burden of proof, personal jurisdiction need not be proved by a preponderance of the evidence until trial or until the court holds an evidentiary hearing.” Ameritas Inv. Corp. v. McKinney, 269 Neb. 564, 694 N.W.2d 191 Neb.,2005.    There is no preponderance of evidence found in the record of this case. “Personal jurisdiction is the power of a tribunal to subject and bind a particular entity to its decisions.”    “Lack of personal jurisdiction may be waived and such jurisdiction conferred by the conduct of the parties.” Trogdon v. Trogdon, 18 Neb.App. 313, 780 N.W.2d 45, Neb.App.,2010.    No preponderance of evidence is found in the record therefore nothing can be binding as to this case.   Paul never waived any type of claim of personal jurisdiction unto the court or the Plaintiff.    Paul just demanded that Plaintiff prove, on the record, evidence that jurisdiction exist that Paul has a duty to stand before a bench trial and has no right to a jury trial in this instant case.   “…due to improper service and lack of actual notice, a court fails to obtain personal jurisdiction over the party in possession of or owning the property being sold.”   Curtis v. Giff, 17 Neb.App. 149, 757 N.W.2d 139, Neb.App.,2008.    No evidence of personal service, or actual notice upon Paul is found anywhere in the record.

“A judgment entered without personal jurisdiction is void.”  Cave v. Reiser 268 Neb. 539, 684 N.W.2d 580, Neb.,2004.    This cases judgments are void where personal jurisdiction is not proven in the record on each individual charge, “…a party could file a special appearance for the sole purpose of objecting to the court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction over the objector.”   Miller v. Steichen, 268 Neb. 328, 682 N.W.2d 702, Neb.,2004.    Paul was arrested and forced before the court and did each time challenge personal jurisdiction as with each individual charge.

“the party seeking to establish the court’s in personam jurisdiction still carries the burden of proof, and the burden does not shift to the party challenging jurisdiction.” Ameritas Inv. Corp. v. McKinney, 269 Neb. 564, 694 N.W.2d 191 (2005).    The Plaintiff produced no preponderance of evidence to prove up personal jurisdiction when challenged on the record.   “To defeat a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the nonmoving party need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction.” Applied Underwriters, Inc. v. Employer Outsource Service, Inc., 2007 WL 1470454 (Neb. Ct. App. 2007).    No prima facia showing is found in the record and court refused to revile such finding, evidence noticed, to Paul so that he could challenge such alleged evidence.    Persuasive Cases:  Plaintiff has burden to sustain requisite jurisdiction when motion is made to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, but once prima facie case has been established, defendant bears burden of producing evidence to rebut that showing.   Omni Lingua, Inc. v. Great Golf Resorts of World, Inc. 500 N.W.2d 721, Iowa App.,1993.    No evidence was ever presented so Paul could rebut.   Court refused to reveal findings when motioned. Statute 25-1127, 1131,   The Court of Appeals held that personal jurisdiction over nonresident former employee was consistent with due process. Omaha Cold Storage Terminals v. Cunningham 417 N.W.2d 254, Iowa App.,1987.    Thus if personal jurisdiction is not proven as challenged it is a due process violation against the man Paul.  “Where a court failed to observe safeguards, it amounts to denial of due process of law, court is deprived of jurisdiction.”    Merritt v. Hunter, C.A. Kansas 170 F2d 739.  Motion to Dismiss, Personal Jurisdiction Challenge. (T 99-100, and 101)    “When acting to enforce a statute and its subsequent amendments to the present date, the

judge of the municipal court is acting as an administrative officer and not in a judicial capacity; courts in administering or enforcing statutes do not act judicially, but merely ministerially”.    Thompson v. Smith, 154 SE 583.    The free inhabitant, Paul, demanded proof that they had legal standing to force him in front of the cases administrative officer, and thus denying him a common-law trial by jury guaranteed in the organic law of the land due to native-born men like Paul.   L. Court errored to see that the Plaintiff failed to produced sufficient evidence that each individual charge did in fact apply to the Defendant as a private man, and not a statutory person/entity only. (Essentially acknowledging a difference of Public statutes vs. Private state.)  (This error is essentially the same as one of Suder’s list.) No evidence was produced that Paul was a “privileged” person (a statutorily governed person), therefore the presumption of right remains which is governed by common law.  No evidence was presented that the Man Paul John or his property was subject to written laws that apply upon land owned or ceded to a government entity associated with the United States of America. Paul John, Appellant, has a natural right to own, use, enjoy, alienate, defend in a common law court, and even exclude man created government, agencies, from his private property that is not in a United States of America Possession or Territory subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States of America.  “the free inhabitants of each of these States,..” Article IV. Articles of Confederation of November 15, 1777, Paul John, Appellant, has a natural right to a common law remedy with all issues related to his private property, land, independent of written law. Paul as “the free inhabitants of each of these States,..” Article IV. Articles of Confederation of November 15, 1777.  Though safety and health is a common law violation the Plaintiff did not allege this but claimed that Paul was subject to the City Municipal Code.  If a common law claim was initiated by the Plaintiff the controversy would have flowed to a common-law hearing upon Paul’s demand as a native-born of right. It is a violation of the CITY OF OMAHA charter/constitution to drag those not in their jurisdiction to their administrative courts.   Paul’s motion for Plaintiff to put fact proof of personal jurisdiction, with court findings, to prove jurisdiction over Him had to be done for each individual charge before the court could gain personal jurisdiction over Paul and force him through the pains of discovery, legal cost, trial, gathering witnesses and evidence for his defense and ultimately trial before the administrative court/tribunal.     a. Plaintiff produced no fact proof that Paul placed his land and shelters in the corporate CITY OF OMAHA, or corporate DOUGLAS COUNTY, or corporate STATE OF NEBRASKA.     b. Plaintiff produced no fact proof that Paul’s land or shelters were open to the public except by trespass.    c. Plaintiff produced no fact proof that Paul did any act to give jurisdiction to the Administrative Trial Court.   SEE all case law above, in argument “K”, to support this challenge also

M. Court errored in not noticing that Paul was denied due process.

As a law argument for proof of the lack of subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction Paul argues the following:  City claimed investigation as to Code Violations on several Paul’s property, City claimed notice by mailing and attachment to various front doors of Paul’s homes. (SEE EXHIBIT NO. 33)  Paul claims no notice, and herein notices this court of a record that is void of a constitutional notice.  Paul now notices the court that said alleged notice gives Paul “20 days” to appeal to the “Omaha Building Board”. (SEE EXHIBIT NO. 33, page one, paragraph 2)

This is clearly stated that Paul does not get a hearing before the city demanded Paul to vacate the property within two days of the date of this notice. Notice date Oct. 7, ordered to vacate Oct. 9, 2008. Paul therefore not only did not receive constitutional notice, for no place in the record is there evidence Paul waived any constitutional protection such as due process at “notice”, but was moved immediately to a penalty phase as “vacate” and “pay $100.00” if you want to appeal.

What do we have here: a. Starts with an alleged violation. b. No constitutional notice.  c. Notice to vacate. d. No hearing. e. Told if you want your “first” hearing (appeal) you must pay $100.00.  Does not this man have due process rights?  Does Paul have a right to a hearing.  Must he pay before he can be heard?  Is being heard a right. Is it not true that a right can not be taxed?  Is not demanding $100.00 Federal Reserve one dollar notes a tax?     Is it not constitutional for hearing first then the appeal?  Clearly a due process violation of the worst sort.    The plaintiff is damaging Paul and has violated its own charter by denying due process systematically and constructively, against the native –born private person and his private property.  Paul was denied due process for his natural right, God given right, of a jury trial, as found in the Nebraska Constitution a Charter baring excess government and lack of due process. “..The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, ..”  Neb. Const. art. I, sec. 6 (1875).   Adding the said Constitution (Charter / Limiting Document) does not state any time limit but says quote – “inviolate,”.  The courts or the legislature can not, abridge this protection, or infringe on Paul, as a native-born, with his natural rights, from God, to a trial by jury, period.  The said right never came from the government (State) or man (state) and man or the government can not lawfully or legally take the said right away.  “It is a part of our fundamental law that the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.” Fugate v. Skate, 169 Neb. 420, 99 N.W.2d 868 (1959).

N. No evidence is in the record of a promulgated rule that identifies Paul as one

subject to the municipal code, essentially to prove force and effect of law.

No evidence has been presented by the Plaintiff, on the record, that the code that Paul was accused of violating has a record of a promulgated rule that identifies Paul as one subject to the municipal code, to prove notice and force and effect of law upon Paul. (30:22-23 and 33:11-14)

O. Court errored in not noticing that no statute is found in the record makes a violation of a municipal code a criminal violation. No evidence has been produced to prove that the charges Omaha Municipal Code violations is a criminal violation.

P. The Court errored that a charge of “Giving False Information” is not a criminal act subject to arrest. Paul was arrested unconstitutionally for allegedly giving false information which is not a breach of the peace.  “For the purpose of breach of the peace statute, peace is that state and sense of safety which is necessary to the comfort and happiness of every citizen, and which government is instituted to secure.”  State v. Edwards, 239 S,C. 339, 123 S.E. 2d 247, 249.  Also it is highly suspect that the “Omaha Police Department is a government entity.  Evidence is that it is a corporation doing business as the “corporate OMAHA POLICE DEPARTMENT” so registered with EIN number, the same for the “corporate CITY OF OMAHA”.

Q. The Court errored in not noticing that when Paul was arrested and told he was going to be booked that he was not taken before a Magistrate as is due process for any act that is not a breach of the peace. Paul was arrested unconstitutionally for allegedly giving false information which is not a breach of the peace.  Paul therefore had due process right to be taken before a Magistrate for a probable cause hearing before being deprived his liberty as is due a native-born, free inhabitant, man.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Whether it be law or not is not argued here by Paul, where the written law “is law” is the ultimate question before this court.   The Constitution of September 17, 1787, Article VI Clause 2 states:

“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”

Any first year student of law should know as did the members of the Constitutional Convention that laws made under the authority of “this Constitution” would always be limited to the Land owned by the United States of America.

The “Law” is the legislation enacted pursuant to “[A]ll legislative Powers herein granted” and “vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”  At the minimum the authority is proprietary power, possibly not legislative power.  The governable “Land” is identified in Article IV of the Northwest Ordinance of July 13, 1787:

“The said territory, and the States which may be formed therein, shall forever remain a part of this Confederacy of the United States of America, subject to the Articles of Confederation, and to such alterations therein as shall be constitutionally made; and to all the acts and ordinances of the United States in Congress assembled, conformable thereto.”

Ratification of this Constitution by the first nine States establishes “this Constitution” among the States (entities) not the people of those states, a people which Paul is as a “free inhabitant”.

“..,the free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States;..” Article IV, Articles of Confederation of November 15, 1777.

No proof is found on the record that any act of Appellant was done on Land, ceded to, or owned by the United States of America, of which the State of Nebraska, City of Omaha, and Douglas County, are subdivisions of.  If the subject Land is not owned by the USA it is NOT governed by the USA or the USA subdivisions as a matter of law.

The County Court erred by convicting and sentencing Appellant. The District Court erred in affirming because there was no evidence introduced at trial that the Omaha City Code applies to Appellant. Furthermore, there was not sufficient evidence introduced at trial for the Court(s) to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant had the requisite mental state for conviction of Resisting Arrest, False Information, and two counts of Obstruction of a Law Enforcement Officer. Finally, the sentence that Appellant received was excessive, since the court did not consider the non-violent character of the offenses, and the court was improperly swayed by the fact that Appellant proceeded pro se. Accordingly, Appellant respectfully requests that the Nebraska Appeals Court reverse the County Court’s convictions and sentencing decisions. As to all charges Paul John: Hansen did not violate any law that had evidence of force and effect upon him by the record of this case. Plaintiff failed to prove personal jurisdiction on the record as to each individual charges. The record shows a multitude of due process violations.  Paul John has, and had, a common law right, as a birth right, to remedy in trial by jury, and no code, statute, legal or lawful entity can subvert such.  All Courts on the Land of Nebraska, The United States and the United States of America have a foremost duty to not infringe upon any rights of this Appellant.  Respectfully ask that this Court reverse all charges as is it’s duty in this instant case as a matter of law and of justice compliant with an republic form of government.  All references to written law above is only to acknowledge State government limitations and in no way does Paul as an free inhabitant exchange/consent to accepting State protection as a constitutional right but always relies upon His own God given birth right as a free inhabitant as found in Article IV of the Articles of Confederation of November 15, 1777.  I trust that if this case is not ruled as requested a court of competent jurisdiction, as a right, will force the disclosure of all essential jurisdictional challenges, for no bar against can lawfully exist.

1-7-2011  _______________________   Appellant

called- Paul John: Hansen, A Free Inhabitant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the signed, hereby certified that a 2 true copies of the above and foregoing Brief was personally served on Marty Conboy, Assistant City Prosecutor, Hall of Justice, and one (1) original and ten (10) copies to the captioned Nebraska Appeals Court, by pre-paid post, US Mailing, this day of January 7, 2011.                            _________________