Statutory Construction

Every time you are facing a code requirement always look at the
definitions of who / what is included.

The government is ever eager to expand its scope of authority,
doing such is not lawful and often unconstitutional.

‘Person’

I have used the term ‘person’ a number of times, and I believe it deserves some special attention. It derives from the Latin ‘persona,’ an actor’s mask, used in
Greek and Roman times for two purposes…to identify the stage character—for one actor often played more than one role, so he would simply switch masks—and to
project his voice by means of a megaphone-shaped mouth…per sona, by sound. Hence, our word ‘personality,’ that about ourselves which we project to others. In
some, more than others, a presentation that indeed masks our true character or nature. In the Middle Ages it came to be used as synonymous with ‘homo,’ man or
individual. This was not the case in ancient (and modern) Roman law. As one legal historian put it:

jus personarum did not mean law of persons, or rights of persons, but law of status, or condition. A person is here not a physical or individual person, but the
status or condition with which he is invested. (34 Austins Jur., 363. Emphasis added.)

In the 15th century, “person came to be used in legal terminology for one (as a human being, a partnership, or a corporation) that is recognized by the law as the
subject of rights and duties.” (Merriam-Webster’s New Book of Word Histories, 1991. Emphasis added.) Note here that it is only the ‘human being’ in his person, as
a subject of rights and duties. As Ortolan says, in his History of the Roman Law:

The word ‘person’ (persona) does not in the language of the law, as in ordinary language, designate the physical man. In the first, it is every being considered as
capable of having or owing rights, of being the active or passive subject of rights.

We say every being, for men are not alone comprised therein. In fact, law by its power of abstraction creates persons….because it makes of them beings capable
of having or owing rights….

We shall therefore have to discriminate between, and to study, two classes of person: physical or natural persons, for which we find no distinctive denomination in
Roman jurisprudence…; that is to say, the man-person; and abstract persons, which are fictitious and which have no existence except in law; that is to say, those
which are purely legal conceptions or creations.

In another sense, very frequently employed, the word ‘person’ designates each character man is called upon to play on the judicial stage; that is to say, each
quality which gives him certain rights or certain obligations—for instance, the person of father; of son as subject to his father; of husband or guardian. In this sense
the same man can have several personae at the same time. (Emphasis added.)

The Internal Revenue Code is Roman or civil law, together with its sibling, maritime or admiralty law. Thus, as I discuss below, the Supreme Court clearly states
that all income taxes are on corporations, as set forth in the Corporation Tax Act of 1909, not on people. That is why all 48 titles always speak of persons, never
people, human beings, or men or women; a fiction can only deal with a fiction.

This was made clear even before the Constitution, in The Federalist Papers, No. 15:

Except as to the rule of apportionment, the United States have an indefinite discretion to make requisitions for men and money; but they have no authority to raise
either by regulations extending to the individual citizens of America. (Emphasis added.)

Let me put a little flesh on these bones. The Supreme Court stated in Edwards v. Cuba RR Co., 268 US 628 that:

…the meaning of ‘income’ as used in the Corporation Excise Tax Law of 1909 is not to be distinguished from the meaning of the same word as used in the Income
Tax Law of 1913 and the Revenue Act of 1916. Merchants’ Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka 255 US 509. (Emphasis added.)

However, as pointed out by Kenneth Weiland, it is of interest to note, also, a Federal Claims Court case, Maryland Casualty Co. v. U.S.:

By the act of August 5, 1909, a special excise tax was imposed upon the privilege of carrying on business by corporations. It was in reality a license to carry on
business….The Income Tax Act of October 3, 1913, should be considered as a statutory construction of the act of August 5, 1909, in so far as it related to the basis
of taxation. (December Term, 1916-17 [52 C. Cls.] Emphasis added. This will take on further meaning toward the end of this paper.)

Be it noted that in the California Penal Code ‘person’ is clearly distinguished from ‘Citizen.’ Penal Code § 228 states: “Any citizen of this state who shall fight a
duel…” While at § 232 it states: “Any person of this state who fights a duel…” (Emphasis added.)

“In common usage, the term ‘person’ does not include the sovereign…[and] statutes employing the [word] are ordinarily construed to exclude it.” Wilson v. Omaha
Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653, 667 (1979), quoting United States v. Cooper Corp. 312 U.S. 600, 604 (1941).

‘Individual’

The term of art ‘individual’ is also frequently employed in the codes. Which is even more sneaky, because most people believe this word to be, for all intents and
purposes, synonymous with ‘a human being’…what the law refers to as a ‘natural person.’ Roman law hardly referred to such a physical being, except the rare
usage of singularis persona—which, however, still employs ‘persona,’ thereby preserving a juridical nexus, inapplicable to a sentient man (homo). An abstract,
fictitious ‘person’ is needed. Recall Judge Bork, on page 11, above, saying that 90% of those in prison were there because they consented to the process? You
consent when you agree to be subject to a statute dealing with persons—which we have seen to be fictional corporate constructs or entities. The code—any of the
48 titles—only applies to a human being at the point s/he agrees to take on the character, status, persona of an artificial juristic persona. Always remember that
when the code says “…any person,” it means “any person in the jurisdiction of this code.” One obligates oneself to the civil code by an act of assumpsit…i.e.,
volunteering to be that ‘person.’ (Assumpsit: “A promise or engagement by which one person assumes or undertakes to do some act or pay something to another.”
Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th edition. Recall the Chisholm case, above.) You will never see in any code, State or federal, the word ‘man’ or ‘woman’…or ‘people’—at
least I don’t recall having done so—only the juristic, statutory ‘person.’

People are understandably confused about on what I believe to be the correct signification of a particular class of persons, namely, a ‘natural person.’ It is almost
always used loosely to refer to the physical, sentient human being. Indeed, in statutory law this is the term of choice for a living man—but always in a qualified
sense. At 26 CFR 1.6049-4(f) Definitions we read:

The term natural person means any individual, but shall not include a partnership (whether or not composed entirely of individuals), a trust, or an estate.
(Emphasis added.)

Notice carefully how they see it as both possible and necessary to qualify ‘individual.’ If this term stood for a living man, it would be pointless and ridiculous to say
that it could not be a trust or an estate! They wouldn’t say that a man shall not include an estate.

So then, we see that ‘person,’ ‘natural person,’ and ‘individual’ are all fictitious legal creations. And, if you acquiesce to being any of them, in a legal setting, you
thereby agree that the code addresses and applies to you.

This is why some have an aversion to referring to their appearance in court as being ‘in propria persona’…which some do to avoid pleading pro se, ‘for oneself,’
when appearing without an attorney. They don’t want to represent themselves, but be themselves. And, since ‘in propria persona’ means ‘in one’s own proper
person,’ it would seem to overcome this objection. Be this as it may—and I am aware of many arguments pro and con—the court still refers to your appearance as
being pro se. Personally, if I found myself in that situation, I would appear in rerum natura, ‘in the realm of actuality; in existence,’ (Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th
edition) the opposite of being a fictitious person.

We should look, too, at the very first term in the general definition chapter for the entire IRC: Section 7701(a)(1)—and well they should begin there, for all
statutory law rests on the foundation of this juristic fabrication.

Person. The term ‘person’ shall be construed to mean and include an individual, a trust, estate, partnership, association, company, or corporation.

Therefore, since we now know that, in law, ‘person’ can not be anything but a fictitious juridical creation, it follows ineluctably that if ‘individual’ is said to mean the
exact same thing, then it must also refer to the same type of unnatural and artificial entity as ‘person.’

This is pretty well nailed down by a couple of cites from the CFR. At 5 CFR 582.101(4) we read:

Persons may include an individual, partnership, corporation, association, joint venture, private organization or other legal entity, and includes the plural of that
term; person may include any of the entities that may issue legal process as set forth in… (Emphasis added.)

In 7 CFR 400.303(m) we find:

Person means an individual, partnership, association, corporation, estate, trust, or other legal entity, and whenever applicable, a State or a political subdivision, or
agency of a State. (Emphasis added.)

Here it is in the regulations, an individual is a ‘legal entity,’ not a (wo)man, a sentient human being.

So, it makes perfect sense that 5 USC 552a(a)(2) should hold that “the term ‘individual’ means a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence; (3)…” (Emphasis added.) For a ‘citizen’ is certainly a juristic ‘person.’

A discussion of ‘person,’ however, would not be complete without reference to 26 USC 7343 Definition of term “person.” This is at the very end of Chapter 75
Crimes, Other Offenses and Forfeitures, which includes such goodies as § 7203 Willful failure to file return, supply information, or pay tax, which begins: “Any
person required under this title to pay…” (Emphasis added.)

Section 7343 reads in its entirety:

The term ‘person’ as used in this chapter includes [is restricted to] an officer or employee of a corporation [such as the U.S. or some company incorporated in the
federal zone], or a member or employee of a partnership, who as such officer, employee, or member is under a duty to perform the act in respect to which the
violation occurs.

For starters, Section 7203 is a penalty section and makes no attempt to establish any liability. Plus, the implementing regulations are in Title 27 BATF…meaning that
it is exclusively for their use, with excise taxes! It has nothing to do with the IRS. Leaving all that aside, do you believe that you could be charged as being the
person described above? Do you work for the federal government or a domestic (U.S., not State) corporation?

Put up Omaha City Municipal Code.

Nebraska Statutes.
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Legal Words and Consequences

by

Richard McDonald

This is  a newsletter  that may  be dangerous  to your  well  being, as  it contains  some truth  that  you  were  or  are  not supposed to know or understand.

To begin  with, I  must tell  you that all words used in any type of  law have  a specific  meaning attached  as it relates to that specific  law.   They do  not  mean  
the  standard  everyday dictionary  meaning  at  all  times,  as  you  are  mislead  into thinking.

First, you  must understand  that  this  is  an  educational forum, and  I will give you the meanings that are utilized by the various governmental  agencies, to
deprive you of your rights and property.

The word  “person” as  it is  used in  most of  the statutes refers to  the same  person as  defined  in  the  so-called  14th Amendment.   It does  not include  
everyone, as  you are  led  to believe.   There are  several court cases that define who is that specific “person,”  and one  of those  cases is Van Valkenburg v.
Brown, 43 Cal. 43.

Next the  term  “United  States”  has  three  (3)  different distinct, and  separate jurisdictional  meanings.   This has been stated in  Hooven &  Allison Co.  v. Evatt,
324 U. S. 652.  There the court stated:

The term  “United States”  may be used in any one of several senses.   It may  be merely the name of a sovereign occupying the position analogous  to that  of
other sovereigns in the family of nations.   It  may  designate  the  territory  over  which  the sovereignty of  the United  States extends,  or  it  may  be  the
collective name  of the  States which are united by and under the Constitution.

Each  of   these  definitions   have  completely   different jurisdictions and  cannot be  mixed.   Do you  know which  of the meanings are  being utilized when they
say “United States”?  When in doubt,  ASK!   This always brings some type of answer, and you will at  least know  for yourself what they are doing to you with your
permission.

There are  several groups  that are claiming federal rights, that originate in the 1866 Federal Civil Rights Statute, 14 Stat. 27.  They should read and understand
the law before claiming such statutory rights and privileges.  They might be surprised to find out what they are stating and claiming.

The law states the United States is a foreign corporation in relation to  one of  the several  States.    Remember,  that  the District of  Columbia is  not one  of the  
States of the Union of several States, but is a foreign nation (corporation).  See 20 C. J. S.  sec. 1785,  p. 11.  So under these facts of law the “U. S. citizens” of the
District of Columbia are only alien residents in any one  of the  several States.   So,  if all state agencies are operating under the purview of the municipal laws of
the District of Columbia, have they registered with this State’s Department of State as  an agency  of a  foreign power  doing business  in this State?

The original  Political Code  of 1872,  states that  you are either a Citizen of this State, a Citizen of another State, or an alien.   So, if  you do  not possess  Primary
and Paramount State Citizenship, then  you must be a resident alien, who can and must be controlled  at all  times when,  where, how,  and  why  to  do anything
affecting the public (Citizens of the State).

I am a Citizen of this State first, then as a consequence, I am a  Citizen of  the United States of America, as defined in the Original Constitution  for the  United
States  of America (1787), and have  full, complete  and unencumbered  access to  all of the Bill of  Rights (1791),  Amendments 1  through 10.    The  U.  S.
Supreme Court  has stated that since 1969, Amendments 1 through 8 have limited application to the States through the 14th Amendment for the  U. S. citizens.  
They as citizens of a non-state (notice a difference  of status  between the  State and  the District  of Columbia) have  no access  to the  9th and 10th
Amendments.  As a Citizen of  a State,  I have  all the  powers not  given  to  the governments.   I am a sovereign and as the courts have stated the Constitutions
are  a limitation upon the government as it relates to the  Citizen of  the State.   But  this is not so if you are a citizen of  the District  of Columbia.   SO, just what
are you???  If you  are a  slave on  the  Federal  plantation  known  as  the District of Columbia, then act like one.  If you are a Citizen of this State  then act  like
the sovereign you are by heritage and Birthright.  Read and understand the laws that apply to you.  You must always  obey these  laws under  all circumstances.  I
do not obey the laws of Japan, Germany, England or the municipal laws of the District of Columbia for the very simple reason that I am not one of their citizens.

So read the law, understand it and ask questions if in doubt of your status.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
ejusdem generis  (ee-jos-dem jen-o-ris also eejoos- or ee-yoos-). [Latin “of the same kind or class”]
A canon of construction that when a general word or phrase follows a list of specific persons or things, the general word or phrase will be interpreted to include only
persons or things of the same type as those listed.
! For example, in the phrase horses, cattle, sheep, pigs, goats, or any other barnyard animal, the general language or any other barnyard animal — despite its
seeming breadth — would probably be held to include only four-legged, hoofed mammals (and thus would exclude chickens).

— Also spelled eiusdem generis. —Also termed ejusdem generis rule; Lord Ten terden’s rule. Cf. EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS; NOSCITUR A
SOUIS;  RULE OF RANK.

ejusdem  generis rule-Doctrine off-

Lord Ten  terden’s rule-

EXPRESSIO   UNIUS   EST   EXCLUSIO   ALTERIUS;

NOSCITUR A SOUIS;
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Person:  The word “person” shall include and be applied to:   <This is from the OMAHA MUNICIPAL CODE, Definition of “PERSON”.
a firm,(A legal entity.)
partnership, (A legal entity.)
association, (A legal entity.)
corporation, (A legal entity.)
organization, (A legal entity.)
club, society, (A legal entity.)
group acting as a unit, (A legal entity.)
political subdivision, (A legal entity.)
or body politic, (A legal entity.)
and corporate, (A legal entity.)
as well as to an individual.  (Therefore must also mean legal entity.)

Ejusdem generis
[Latin: Of the same kind or nature] A rule of statutory interpretation that where particular words are followed by general words, the general words are limited to
the same kind as the particular worlds.
Thus where the Sunday Observance Act 1677 provided that “no tradesman, artificer, workman, labourer or other person whatsoever shall do or exercise any
worldly labour business or work of their ordinary callings upon the Lord’s Day…” the words “or other persons whatsoever” were to be construed ejusdem generis
with those words which proceeded them so that an estate agent was not within the exception (Gregorry v Fearn [1953])
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/w/index.php?title=Statutory_interpretation&action=edit&section=4Internal and external consistency
It is presumed that a statute will be interpreted so as to be internally consistent. A particular section of the statute shall not be divorced from the rest of the act.
The ejusdem generis rule applies to resolve the problem of giving meaning to groups of words where one of the words is ambiguous or inherently unclear.
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Ejusdem generis (Of the same kinds, class, or nature)

When a list of two or more specific descriptors are followed by more general descriptors, the otherwise wide meaning of the general descriptors must be restricted
to the same class, if any, of the specific words that precede them
e.g where –cars,motor bikes,motor powered, vehicles– are mentioned there the ‘vehicles’ would be interpreted in a limited sense( therefore vehicles cannot be
interpreted as including air planes)
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Expressio unius est exclusio alterius (The express mention of one thing excludes all others)

Items not on the list are assumed not to be covered by the statute. However, sometimes a list in a statute is illustrative, not exclusionary. This is usually indicated
by a word such as “includes.”
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In pari materia (Upon the same matter or subject)

When a statute is ambiguous, its meaning may be determined in light of other statutes on the same subject matter.
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Noscitur a sociis (A word is known by the company it keeps)

When a word is ambiguous, its meaning may be determined by reference to the rest of the statute.
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Rule of Lenity  
In construing an ambiguous criminal statute, the court should resolve the ambiguity in favor of the defendant. See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987);
See, e.g., Muscarello v. U.S., 524 U.S. 125 (1998) (declining to apply the rule of lenity); Evans v. U.S., 504 U.S. 255 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Scarborough
v. U.S., 431 U.S. 563 (1977) (Stewart, J., dissenting); See United States v. Santos (2008).
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Avoidance of abrogation of state sovereignty

See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991); [prerogative as citizens of a sovereign State to do so]

see also Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
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Avoidance Canon (Canon of Constitutional Avoidance)

If a statute is susceptible to more than one reasonable construction, courts should choose an interpretation that avoids raising constitutional problems. In the US,
this canon has grown stronger in recent history. The traditional avoidance canon required the court to choose a different interpretation only when one interpretation
was actually unconstitutional. The modern avoidance canon tells the court to choose a different interpretation when another interpretation merely raises
constitutional doubts.
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Clear Statement Rule

When a statute may be interpreted to abridge long-held rights of individuals or states, or make a large policy change, courts will not interpret the statute to make
the change unless the legislature clearly stated it. This rule is based on the assumption that the legislature would not make major changes in a vague or unclear
way.
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Under the rule of ejusdem generis, “[g]eneral words are construed to be restricted in their meaning by preceding particular words.” Minn. Stat. § 645.08(3) (1996)
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The rule of ejusdem generis, an aid to statutory construction problems, suggests that where general words follow a specific enumeration of persons or things, the
general words should be limited to persons or things similar to those specifically enumerated. The rule of ejusdem generis is no more than an aid to construction
and comes into play only when there is some uncertainty as to the meaning of a particular clause in a statute. UNITED STATES v. TURKETTE
No. 80-808
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
452 U.S. 576; 101 S. Ct. 2524; 1981 U.S. LEXIS 32; 69 L. Ed. 2d 246; 49 U.S.L.W. 4743
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First, it relied in part on the rule of ejusdem generis, an aid to statutory construction problems suggesting that where general words follow a specific enumeration of
persons or things, the general words should be limited to persons or things similar to those specifically enumerated. See 2A C. Sands, Sutherland on Statutory
Construction § 47.17 [**2528] (4th ed. 1973).
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EJUSDEM GENERIS – Of the same kind, class, or nature.
In statutory construction, the “ejusdem generis rule” is that where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific
meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same general kind or
class as those specifically mentioned.
Black’s Law Dictionary, 2nd Edition, pages 415.
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STATES that WHAT the DEFINITIONS actually “include” is LIMITED to those things which are in the SAME GENERAL CLASS as the ENUMERATED items.
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“The constructional problem is resolved by the second principle Alloyd overlooks, which is that a word is known by the company it keeps (the doctrine of noscitur a
sociis).
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RULE OF RANK.

>>
EJUSDEM GENERIS. Of the same kind.
2. In the construction of laws, wills and other instruments, when certain things are enumerated, and then a phrase is used which might be construed to include
other things, it is generally confined to things ejusdem generas; as, where an act (9 Ann. C. 20) provided that a writ of quo warranto might issue against persons
who should usurp “the offices of mayors, bailiffs, port reeves, and other offices, within the cities, towns, corporate boroughs, and places, within Great Britain,” &c.;
it was held that “other offices” meant offices ejusdem generis; and that the word “places” signified places of the same kind; that is, that the offices must be
corporate offices, and the places must be corporate Places. 5 T. R. 375,379; 5 B . & C. 640; 8 D. & Ry. 393; 1 B. & C. 237.
3. So, in the construction of wills, when certain articles are enumerated, the terra goods is to be restricted to those ejusdem generis. Bac. Ab. Legacies, B; 3 Rand.
191; 3 Atk. 61; Abr. Eq. 201; 2 Atk. 113.
BOUVIER”S LAW DICTIONARY 1856 Edition